

UNIT 1: FORERUNNERS OF THE AMERICAN PRESS

1. Why has man always had a curious interest in news?
2. Who were the world's earliest correspondents?
3. Who did the pre-printing press serve?
4. What type of society was modern mass media born into?
5. What brought about the Libertarian Theory of the Press?
6. What is our English heritage?
7. Why should we study the English press?
8. Where did freedom of speech and press originate?
9. What kind of press control existed in England?

The Crown's System of Control

What English agencies controlled the press?

1. The Stationers' Company
 - a. Guild of master publishers
 - b. Guild chartered to monopolize the press
 - c. Vested with search and seizure powers
2. The Court of High Commission
 - a. Highest ecclesiastical tribunal
 - b. Controlled Stationers' Company
 - c. Did actual licensing
3. The Court of Star Chamber
 - a. Defined criminal matters
 - b. Shared with jurisdiction with
Court of High Commission

English Law of Criminal Libel

What major classes of criminal libel existed that influenced early colonists?

1. Blasphemous libel or defamation of religion
2. Private libel which protected individuals reputation
3. Gross libel, to prevent supposed bad tendencies toward breach of the peace
4. Seditious libel

Seditious Libel

How was seditious libel defined in England and later the colonies?

1. Defaming, condemning, ridiculing:
 - a. The government;
 - b. Its form;
 - c. The constitution;
 - d. Laws;
 - e. Officers;
 - f. Laws;
 - g. Conduct;
 - h. Policies
2. Any malicious criticism about the government:
 - a. That could lower it in the public esteem;
 - b. Hold it up to contempt or hatred
 - c. Disturb the peace
3. Words damaging to the government that tended to cause breach of the peace

The Authoritarian Theory of the Press

1. The state ranks higher than the individual in the scale of social values.
2. The source of truth has two characteristics:
 - a. It is restricted; not every person has access to it;
 - b. It becomes the standard for all members of society.
3. Printing was to carry wisdom and truth as wisdom and truth were identified by the rulers.
4. Access to the press was restricted to those who would operate for the "good of the state" as judged by rulers.
5. No publishing was permitted that would injure the state and its citizens.

The Libertarian Theory of the Press

What were the elements of this new theory?

1. Reliance on reason to discriminate between truth and error.
2. Need of a free marketplace of ideas in order that reason may work.
3. Function of the press as a check on government

The Libertarian Theory of the Press

A. What Brought About this Startling Change?

1. Power of human reason over inherited knowledge
2. Reformation challenged authority of Church of Rome
3. New middle class
 - a. Challenged idea of fixed status
 - b. Ushered in world of social mobility
4. Political revolutions challenge right to arbitrary rule
5. Enlightenment
 - a. Intellectual revolution
 - b. Focus from theology to scientific inquiry

UNIT I: FORERUNNERS OF THE AMERICAN PRESS

A. Man's Early Interest in News

B. Europe's Earliest Correspondents

1. Slaves
2. Town criers
3. Wandering monks

C. Europe's Pre-Press Lords

1. Princes and Statesmen
2. Clergy
3. Merchants and Financiers

D. The Authoritarian Theory of the Press

1. Truth restricted
2. Truth standard for all members of society

E. Changes Influence A Different Theory

1. Power of human reason over inherited knowledge
2. Reformation challenges the church
3. Swift new growth of middle class
4. Revolutions challenge right of arbitrary rule
5. Enlightenment transfers focus of interest from theology to science

F. The Libertarian Theory of the Press

1. John Milton's Areopagitica

- a. Men have reason and wisdom to distinguish right from wrong
- b. Men can exercise fullest power only when they have a free choice

2. Fundamentals of Libertarianism

- a. Reliance on reason to discriminate between truth and error
- b. The need for a free marketplace of ideas
- c. The function of the press as a check on government

G. The English Press: Our Early Heritage

1. Contributions

- a. Printing presses imported from England
- b. Names, form and make copied from England
- c. English news is American news

2. Attitudes Toward the Press
 - a. Church and state distrusted press
 - b. Royal patents issued to limit press
3. Freedom of the Press and Speech
 - a. Originated in Parliament during struggle to achieve free debates
 - b. Personal right of citizen's personal right
4. The Crown's System of Control
 - a. The Stationers' Company
 - b. The Court of High Commission
 - c. The Court of Star Chamber
5. Four Classes of Criminal Libel
 - a. Blasphemous libel (Defamation of Religion)
 - b. Private libel
 - c. Gross libel (Breach of Peace)
 - d. Seditious libel

THE COLONIAL PRESS

A. The Colonies

1. New England Colonies
2. Middle Colonies
3. Southern Colonies

B. The Colonies and the Lag in Establishing a Press

1. Wilderness absorbed energies of colonists
2. English papers satisfy thirst for news
3. Colonist had few ties with one another
4. No means of supporting a popular press

C. Development in Colonies to Enhance Press Development

1. Population increases
2. Farming expands
3. Seafarers need to advertise wares
4. Postal service born
5. Trend toward self-government
6. Illiteracy cut
7. Printers open commercial shops

D. Early Colonial Press: From Compliance to Dissent

1. John Campbell: Compliance
 - a. Published first regular newspaper: Boston News-
-Letter, by authority
 - b. A Postmaster
2. James Franklin: Dissent
 - a. Published New England Courant, without
authority
 - b. First real editor
 - c. First to use crusade
 - d. Unshackled press from the licenser
3. Benjamin Franklin: Compliance and Dissent
 - a. Published Pennsylvania Gazette, best Colonial
paper
 - b. His Apology called for diverse opinions in
press
 - c. He made journalism respectable

E. Colonies and Freedom of Expression

1. Three misconceptions
 - a. Times rife with struggle between royal judges
and American writers
 - b. Royal governors and judges a major threat to
free expression

- c. Popular assemblies greatest champions of free expression
- 2. Sedition Enforcement
 - a. Provincial legislatures
 - b. Executive officers in concert with upper house
 - c. Common-law courts
- 3. Trials for Sedition
 - a. William Bradford
 - (1) First time raised contention that jury was to try whole of the matter--criminality of publication and defendant's responsibility
 - (2) Jury deadlocks
 - b. Peter Zenger
 - (1) Hamilton contended that truth of a libel should be a defense
 - (2) Hamilton also contended that jury should decide both law and fact
 - (3) No impact on legal precedent
 - (4) Trial awakened colonies' conscience to power a jury might have and necessity for an unrestrained press

What Kept the Colonist From Developing Newspapers?

1. Wilderness absorbed energies.
2. English papers satisfied desires for news.
3. Colonists had few ties to other communities.
4. No support for a press.

THE REVOLUTIONARY PRESS

- A. Causes of the Revolution**
- B. Role of press in fomenting revolution**
- C. The leaders**
 - 1. James Rivington--Tory Spokesman**
 - 2. James Dickinson--Whig Philosopher**
 - 3. Samuel Adams--Radical Propagandist**
 - 4. Edes and Gill's Boston Gazette**
 - 5. Sons of Liberty**

THE REVOLUTIONARY PRESS

Causes for Revolution

1. Clash of debtor and creditor
2. Weakness of British policy
3. Inept leadership
4. Overemphasis on mercantile system
5. Restraints on commerce and industry developments
6. Frontier lands denied Colonists
7. Refusal of British to grant home rule
8. Class struggle by "agitators"

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B. The Stamp Act

1. Alienates two groups
 - a. Lawyers
 - b. Publishers
2. Contents
 - a. Heavy duty on newsprint
 - b. Heavy tax on legal documents
3. British reasons for the tax

C. Leaders of the American Revolution

1. James Rivington: The Tory Philosophy
 - a. Talented editor
 - b. First bookseller in Colonies
 - c. Spy???
 - d. Target of mob action
2. James Dickinson: The Whig Philosophy
 - a. "Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania"
 - b. Influential because respected by propertied class
3. Samuel Adams: The Radical Philosophy
 - a. Editor

- b. Master of the puppets
 - c. Suggested union of Colonies
- 4. Edes and Gill's Boston Gazette
 - a. Adams' band members
 - b. Nerve center of Boston radicals
- 5. Sons of Liberty
 - a. Adams' other band members
 - b. Movements
 - (1) Boston Massacre
 - (2) Tea Act
 - (3) Closing of Boston port

THE PARTY PRESS

A. The Parties

1. Federalists

2. Anti-Federalists

Alexander Hamilton

Thomas Jefferson

B. The Parties and Their Conceptions of Free Expression

C. Development of Free Expression

D. Limiting Free Expression

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Three Stages in the Development of Civil War Military Censorship

1. Denial by the Post Office of messages sent to enemy areas.
2. Censor taken from the State Department and put under the direction of the Secretary of War.
3. Total cooperation by the press from 1864 to the end of the war.

World War I

1. President Wilson appointed a Committee on Public Information.
 - a. Purpose of the Committee on Public Information
 - (1) Disseminate facts about the war.
 - (2) Coordinate government propaganda efforts.
 - (3) Drew up voluntary censorship code.
 - b. George Creel directed the Committee on Public Information.
2. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917
 - a. Opened wedge for suppression of those considered disloyal to the American and Allied war cause.
 - b. Heavy fines and imprisonment for willful making of false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the successful operation of the military or naval forces.
 - c. Empowered postmaster to declare unmailable all letters, circulars, newspapers, pamphlets, books and other materials violating provisions of the act.
3. Trading-with-the Enemy Act of October 1917
 - a. Authorized censorship of all communications moving in or out of the United States.
 - b. Provided that translations of newspapers or magazine articles published in foreign languages could be demanded by the Post Office.

4. The Sedition Act of May 1918

- a. Made it a crime to write or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous or abusive language about the form of government of the United States or the Constitution, military or naval forces, flag or the uniform or to use language intended to bring these ideas and institutions into contempt, scorn, contumely or disrepute.
- b. Gave postmaster immense powers.

World War II

1. Office of Censorship instituted

- a. Byron Price named director.
- b. Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press issued.
 - (1) Outlined to newspapers, magazines, books and other printed materials what would constitute improper handling of news, having to do with troops, planes, ships, war production, armaments, military installations and weather.
 - (2) Same instructions were given to radio.

2. Office of War Information established.

- a. Elmer Davis served as director.
- b. Its functions were many.
 - (1) Act as a city desk for the nation's war news.
 - (2) News releases relating significantly to the war effort or dealing with activities affecting more than one government agency had to pass through the OWI News Bureau.
 - (3) It offered weekly news digests, columns, cartoons to the press.

**CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE PRESS**

- A. Three Waves of Sensationalism
- B. Social Responsibility of the Press
- C. Concentration of Ownership
 - 1. 1910-1930
 - 2. 1930-1980s
- D. Chain Ownership

Three Waves of Sensationalism

1. 1833--The Penny Press (Emphasis on human interest stories).
2. 1897--The Gilded Age (Emphasis on self-advertisement).
3. 1920--Jazz Journalism (Emphasis on tabloids and photography).

Reasons for the Decline of Newspapers Between 1910-1930

- 1. Economic pressures stemming from technological changes in the publishing pattern.**
- 2. Pressures resulting from competition for circulation and advertising revenue.**
- 3. Standardization of the product, resulting in loss of individuality and reader appeal.**
- 4. Lack of economic or social need for some newspapers.**
- 5. Managerial faults.**
- 6. Effects of wartime inflation and general business depressions.**
- 7. Planned consolidation of newspapers for various reasons.**

**Effects on Newspapers of Intermedia Advertising Competition
1930-1980s**

1. The number of dailies decreased then stabilized near 1,700 figure.
2. Ownership concentration increased as the number of competitive dailies declined.
3. Circulation steadily increased.
4. While financial problems were many, the newspaper publishing economy tended to stabilize comfortably.

Table 20-1 Competition in Daily Newspaper Cities, 1940-1986

	1940	1945	1954	1961	1971	1976	1986
Number of general circulation dailies	1878	1744	1785	1763	1748	1756	1676
Number of cities with dailies	1426	1396	1448	1461	1511	1550	1533
Number of one-daily cities	1092	1107	1188	1222	1312	1369	1402
Number of one-combination cities	149	161	154	160	141	122	80
Number of joint-printing cities	4	11	19	18	21	20	22
Number of cities with competing dailies	181	117	87	61	37	39	29
Percentage of cities with competing dailies	12.7	8.4	6.0	4.2	2.4	2.5	1.9
Total daily circulation (millions)	41.1	45.9	54.5	58.9	62.1	60.6	62.7

Sources: For number of dailies and circulation: *Editor & Publisher International Year Books*. For other data: Raymond B. Nixon and Jean Ward, "Trends in Newspaper Ownership and Inter-Media Competition," *Journalism Quarterly*, XXXVIII (Winter 1961), 3. For 1971, compiled from 1971 *Year Book* data by Nixon, for 1976, compiled from 1976 *Year Book* data by Judith Sobel. See *Journalism Quarterly*'s Spring 1978 volume for an article with more detailed data by Sobel and Emery. For 1986, compiled from 1986 *Year Book* data and ANPA's *Facts About Newspapers* '86.

*From data supplied by *Editor & Publisher Yearbook* and media analyses by ANPA and John Morton Research. Figures for groups with circulations above 1 million in 1986 are as follows in thousands (figures for Media News are 1987):

GROUP	TOTAL CIRCULATION	PERCENT OF DAILY CIRCULATION	NUMBER DAILIES	NUMBER SUNDAYS
Gannett	5724	8.8	90	61
Knight Ridder	3793	5.9	34	24
Newhouse	2987	4.6	27	20
Times Mirror	2643	4.1	9	8
Chicago Tribune Co.	2622	4.0	9	7
Dow Jones	2537	3.9	25	10
New York Times Co.	1826	2.8	26	15
Scripps-Howard	1516	2.3	21	9
Thomson	1481	2.3	97	45
Media News (Singleton)	1300	2.0	29	17
Cox	1297	2.0	20	16
News America (Murdoch)	1205	2.0	3	2
Hearst	1039	1.6	14	10

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(3)

Reserve 3
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THE STORY JOURNALISM OF HEARST AND PULITZER

- A. Characteristics of the Gilded Age
- B. Development of Two Journalisms
 - 1. Story Telling Journalism
 - 2. Information Journalism
- C. Story Journalism of Joseph Pulitzer
- D. Story Journalism of William Randolph Hearst
- E. Information Journalism of Adolph Ochs
- G: The Working Journalist in 1880

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GILDED AGE OF AMERICA (1865-1900)

- 1. High birth rate and heavy immigration between 1870 and 1900 combined to double the nation's population, which rose to 75 million.**
- 2. Economic expansion is unprecedented.**
- 3. Labor organizes nationally with wage earners increasing from 1.3 million to 5.3 million.**
- 4. Politics of the period reflects industrial trends.**
- 5. Education advances on many fronts.**
- 6. City life reflected in the press as newspapers became less rural and more a product of the metropolis. Newspapers gave a variety of news reflecting cosmopolitan interests of readers.**
- 7. Baseball, new stage plays and vaudeville become popular.**
- 8. More women read the news.**
- 9. Evening editions outdistance morning issues.**
- 10. Sunday editions become popular.**
- 11. Great socio-economic problems of the Gilded Age were examined by novelists and writers.**
- 12. Scientific progress is notable.**
- 13. Newspaper personnel expand.**

OBJECTIVES ESPOUSED ON THE EDITORIAL PAGES OF JOSEPH PULITZER

Economic

1. Tax luxuries
2. Tax inheritances
3. Tax large incomes
4. Tax monopolies
5. Tax the privileged corporations
6. Impose tariff for revenue

Government


7. Reform civil service
8. Punish court officeholders
9. Punish vote buying
10. Punish employers who coerce their employees in elections

PULITZER'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO JOURNALISM

- 1. Developed the technique of the crusade.**
- 2. Revitalized the editorial page.**
- 3. Popularized the Sunday edition.**
- 4. Revolutionized the practice of selling advertising space.**
- 5. Rationalized newspaper business practices.**
- 6. Forged a new relationship between newspapers and advertisers.**

TECHNIQUES OF SELF-ADVERTISEMENT DURING THE GUILDED AGE

1. Use of illustrations.
2. Larger and darker headlines.
3. Newspaper promotion of exclusive features.



* Estimated value

E HEARST PHILOSOPHICAL LEGACY

1. Public ownership of public franchises
2. Destruction of criminal trusts
3. Graduated income tax
4. Election of U.S. senators by popular vote
5. Local improvements of public schools
6. Coal mines, railroad, telegraph lines be nationalized
7. McKinley stooge of Mark Hanna

HEARST'S CONTRIBUTIONS: THE POSITIVE SIDE

1. He made the morning, evening and Sunday editions more interesting.
2. He developed the human interest story.
3. He developed further the new headline technique, including the banner head, and he altered front page makeup.
4. He printed full-page Sunday features.
5. He embarked on crusades against corruption in government
6. He exposed the trusts and set people thinking about the economic system.
7. He employed skilled writers and was the first to pay high salaries.
8. He popularized science for the masses.
9. He was a spokesman for lower economic classes.

HEARST'S CONTRIBUTIONS: THE DEBIT SIDE


1. His reporters often exaggerated stories to make them sensational and appealing to large numbers of people.
2. He often twisted facts to gain effect, as in the Spanish-American War.
3. He emphasized crime and sex news.
4. He developed the newspaper as a medium of escape entertainment.
5. He aroused the war spirit and goaded the United States in the Spanish-American War.

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Reserve 3

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THE PENNY PRESS

- A. Social and Cultural Preparations for the Penny Press**
- B. Penny vs. Six-Penny Press**
- C. Reasons for the Change in Journalism**
 - 1. Technological Change Argument**
 - 2. Literacy Argument**
- D. Penny Press Contributes to the Free Market**
- E. Giants of the Penny Press Era**
 - 1. Benjamin Day**
 - 2. James Gordon Bennett**
 - 3. Horace Greeley**
 - 4. Henry Raymond**

**Social, Cultural Preparation for Emergence of Penny Press
(1800-1830)**



THE PENNY PRESS

Penny vs. Six-Cent Press

- 1. Cost: 1 vs. 6 cents**
- 2. Editing: Personal vs. mass operation**
- 3. Advertising: Moral vs. economic incentives**
- 4. Politics: Servant vs. master**
- 5. Content: Views vs. News**
- 6. Reporters: Printer vs. Professional**

THE PENNY PRESS

Why was the Penny Press and original product?

1. It was nonpartisan.
2. It covered "local" news.
3. It had a broad definition of news values.
4. It focused on everyday life.

THE PENNY PRESS

Examining the Technological Argument

1. Manufacture and development of better printing presses.
 - a. Manual power gives way to steam power.
 - b. Flatbed press gives way to cylinder press.
2. Introduction of stereotyping process.
3. Development of papermaking machines.
4. Transportation advances.

THE PENNY PRESS

Elements of Jacksonian Democracy

- 1. Faith in the common man.**
- 2. Belief in political equality.**
- 3. Belief in equal economic opportunity.**
- 4. Hatred of monopoly and special privilege.**

THE PENNY PRESS

How did the Penny Press contribute to the extension of the market?

- 1. Advertisements were made available to more people.**
- 2. Newspapers were transformed from something borrowed to something bought for home consumption.**

THE PENNY PRESS

Benjamin Day's Contributions:

1. He placed more emphasis on NEWS.
2. He hired the first police reporter.
3. He discovered the human side of news.
4. He introduced new advertising policies.
5. He instituted display type.
6. He sold papers directly to man on the street.

THE PENNY PRESS

James Gordon Bennett's Positive Contributions:

1. Developed new concept of news.
2. Began aggressive news coverage at all levels.
3. Widened news coverage.
4. Put liveliness in newswriting.
5. Promoted political independence.
6. Issued "late" editions.
7. Used communication facilities more fully.
8. Widened newspaper audience.
9. Improved advertising methods--forced advertisers to change copy.
10. Put newspaper on better financial base.

Negative aspects:

1. Encouraged haste.
2. Promoted cynical attitude toward people.
3. Stressed emotional feelings.
4. Promoted news fakes.
5. Misused humor in serious news.
6. Degenerated editorial page and function.

THE PENNY PRESS

Greeley promised:

- 1. Appeal to the laboring class.**
- 2. Advance moral, social and political well being.**
- 3. Advocate the principles of the Whig Party.**
- 4. Be no slave to no party.**
- 5. Publish political, literary and general intelligence.**
- 6. Omit degrading police reports since Tribune was to be a family newspaper.**

THE PENNY PRESS

Editorially, Greeley advocated:

- 1. A protective tariff for industry.**
- 2. A national bank and sound currency.**
- 3. Internal improvements, such as highways, canals, railroads.**
- 4. Land reform, the opening of cheap western lands.**

THE PENNY PRESS

Greeley's contributions:

1. First to demonstrate one can publish a cheap daily void of sensationalism.
2. Proved that a cheap, popular paper need not be political neutral.
3. Showed that newspaper could reflect needs and problems of urban commercial and industrial worker.
4. Sought to solve problems of Machine Age in America.
5. Revealed how the newspaper might channel new ideas and viewpoints to the public in a democracy.
6. Reestablished the value of the editorial page.
7. Acquired an outstanding editorial staff.
8. Managed to maintain a literary character in Tribune.
9. He set or the press a high standard and spirit of reform.

THE PARTY PRESS

- A. The Parties**
 - 1. Federalists**
 - 2. Anti-Federalists**
- B. The Parties and Their Conceptions of Free Expression**
- C. Development of Free Expression**
- D. Limiting Free Expression**

MAGAZINES AND MUCKRAKERS

- A. Early History of Magazines**
- B. Setting for Muckrakers**
- C. Magazines of the Muckraking Era**
 - 1. The Snobs**
 - 2. The Populist Magazines**
 - 3. The Cheap Magazines**
- D. The Cheap Magazines: What Made Them Possible?**
- E. Muckraking As a Movement**
- F. Roosevelt and the Muckrakers**
- G. The Muckrakers**
 - 1. Lincoln Steffens**
 - 2. Ida Tarbell**
 - 3. Upton Sinclair**
 - 4. David Graham Phillips**
- H. Why Was the Muckraker Era Unique?**
- I. Reaction to the Muckrakers: Negative and Positive**
- J. What Brought About the Decline of the Muckrakers?**
- K. The Modern Muckrakers**
- L. The Transition to Photography: Henry Luce and His Empire**

Setting for the Muckrakers

1. Immigrants reside in tenement ghettos.
2. Millions move westward to close frontier.
3. Older Americans make up middle class.
4. Business tycoons direct industry.
5. One-tenth of the population owned nine-tenths of the nation's wealth.
6. Trusts and monopolies dominate business.
7. Factories become more important to the nation's economic life.
8. Organized wealth flourished in its domination of politics.
9. Political corruption becomes a daily love affair between big business and the big political boss.

Magazines of the Muckraking Era

A. The Snobs

- 1. Harper's**
- 2. Scribner's**
- 3. The Century**
- 4. The Atlantic Monthly**

B. The Populists

- 1. Cosmopolitan**
- 2. Munsey's**

C. The Cheap Magazines

- 1. McClure's**
- 2. Collier's**
- 3. Hampton's**
- 4. The Independent**
- 5. The American Magazine**

What Made the Cheap Magazine Possible?

- 1. Mechanical costs drop.**
- 2. Inexpensive photoengraving techniques develop.**
- 3. Readership increases.**

Why Was the Muckrake Era Unique?

1. A group of writers hammered away at the ills of society.
 - a. Writing was factual though critical.
 - b. Writing was aimed at the social conscience of the nation.
 - c. Aim of writing was to expose not to solve.
2. Magazines provide a national medium for articles.
3. Every phase of American life was attacked.

Reactions to Muckraking Articles: Negative and Positive

Negative

1. Muckraking was a colossal scheme to make money.
2. Muckrakers harmed men who did not deserve it.
3. Muckrakers were on the scent for scandal and blackmail because it was salable.

Positive

1. Muckraking was responsible for legislation.
 - a. Pure Food and Drug Act
 - b. Reform in life insurance
 - c. Improvement in advertising
2. Muckraking was responsible for many accomplishments.
 - a. Wall Street cannot gull the public.
 - b. Insurance was put on a sounder basis.
 - c. Banking added new safeguards.
 - d. The hour of the old-time political boss had struck.
 - e. People named their own candidates.
 - f. Children had their day in court.
 - g. Protection was offered the weak from gambling sharks.
3. The tone of business was raised.
4. Public relations developed.
5. Trusts and city bosses were put on the defensive.
6. Provided for the movement toward social democracy.

What Brought About the Decline of the Muckraker?

- 1. World War I**
- 2. President Wilson's new freedom**
- 3. Advertiser withdrew ads**
- 4. Big business through press agents "unsell" anything**
- 5. Public tired of reading about corruption**
- 6. The government did its own muckraking by creating
commissions**
- 7. Muckrakers went too far**
- 8. Magazines were forced into bankruptcy.**

HISTORY OF FILM

A. Five Phases of Film Development

1. Early Experiments

- a. Projection: The Magic Latern**
- b. Animation: Principles and Practice**
- c. Photography: From Still to Stopped Motion**
- d. The Motion Picture**

2. Film as a Story-telling Medium

3. Consolidation: Production, Distribution, Exhibition

4. Sound Movies

5. Upheaval and Radical Change

B. Coping in the 60s, 70s and 80s

Thomas Edison

1. He developed the Kinetoscope.
2. He remained resolutely fixed on the coin-in-the-slot peep show.
3. His interest was in selling machines.

Edwin Porter

1. He developed the special visual potential of films.
2. He made effective use of film's potential for editing.
3. His innovations did not become general in early movies.

David W. Griffith

1. He emerged as a master of film technique.
2. He was the greatest American film storyteller.
3. He raised movies to the level of art.
4. He made film a powerful, popular entertainment medium.
5. He established the feature-length motion picture as respectable, popular art form.

Disadvantages of Sound

1. Early microphones picked up sounds indiscriminately.
2. Early talkies reverted to days when films were little more than filmed stage plays.
3. Film editing was limited.
4. Some silent stars could not make the transition to sound

Advantages of Sound

1. It made dialogue, musicals, and verbal humor possible.
2. It allowed characters to verbalize their inner thoughts.
3. It added clout to actions like gunshots and explosions.
4. Off-screen voices or sound could provide narration or other information without a change in the visual image.

Decisions to Spur Movie Attendance During the Depression

1. Dropped Ticket prices.
2. Gave away door prizes.
3. Staged games and lotteries.
4. Started the double bill

Coping with Realities of the 50s and 60s

1. Themes of movies changed.
2. Lavish, big-budget films were featured.
3. Studios become subsidiaries of large conglomerates.

Coping in the '70s and '80s

1. A new clientele--the youth market--was exploited.
2. Production, distribution and exhibition were separated.
3. Studios were absorbed.

The Impact of Studios by Conglomerates

1. Profits from successful films went into general corporate coffers.
2. Corporate decision-making placed authority in the hands of people who knew little about movies.
3. Film's creative process was put in the hands of specialized technicians.

HISTORY OF ADVERTISING

Introduction: Advertising: A "Privileged Form of Discourse"

I. HISTORY OF ADVERTISING

A. The Origins and Development of American Advertising

1. Pre-19th Century: Newspaper Ads
2. 1865-1900: Magazine Ads
3. 1900-1945: Radio Ads
4. 1945-Present: Television Ads

B. The Development of Advertising Agencies

1. 1840-1850: Newspaper Agency State
2. 1850-1860: Space-Hobbing Agency Stage
3. 1865- : Space-Wholesaling Agency
4. Late 1860s: Advertising Concession Agency

C. Historical Look at Ethical Considerations in Advertising

1. George P. Rowell and Ethical Considerations
2. Francis Ayer and Ethical Considerations

D. The Development of Advertising Copywriting

1. John E. Power's Style of Ad Writing
2. Hard Sell Style: Reason Why Advertising
3. Soft Sell Style
4. Marketing Advice Through Marketing Research

E. History of Political Advertising: Selling the President

II: ADVERTISING AND THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN CULTURE

HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADVERTISING AGENCY

- A. Stage One: Newspaper Agency State (1840s-1850s)**
- B. Stage Two: Space-Jobbing Agency Stage (1860s)**
- C. Stage Three: Space-Wholesaling Agency (1865-)**
- D. Stage Four: Advertising Concession Agency (late 1860s)**

Development of Advertising Copywriting

1. John E. "Power Style"

- a. He was the first full-time advertising copywriter in North America.
- b. He brought the simple and straightforward prose that became known as the "Power's" style to ad writing--plain, unadorned writing style with an emphasis on advertising as business news, e.g. inform the buyer about products/goods.
- c. He represented the new concern for communication skills being required by a whole range of businesses entering advertising without connections to the communications industry.

2. Hard Sell Style: Reason Why Advertising

- a. Effectrive copy became the heart and soul of advertising.
- b. This culminated in J.E. Kennedy's "salesmanship in print"--known as "reason why" approach.
- c. Hard sell approach (to persuade and to motivate) was used in candidate advertising with Rosser Reeves.

3. Soft Sell Style

- a. E. E. Calkins was concerned with visual appeal.
- b. Tony Schwartz developed the resonance theory of communication: At the core of advertising's purposes is not the message itself as a communicator of meaning, but rather its relationship to the audience.

Volney Palmer

- 1. He is considered to be the first independent advertising agent in North America.**
- 2. He offered a list of selected journals in which he would arrange the placement of ads.**
- 3. He offered free estimates, collecting a 25-percent commission on placements from newspapers.**
- 4. He employed S.M. Pettingall--the copywriter.**

George P. Rowell

1. He took space brokerage to its logical conclusion.
2. He bought annual blocks of publisher's space, which he then resold to his clients at the rate of \$100 per inch per month in 100 papers.
3. He offered advertisers discounts for prompt payment.

Rowell's and Ethical Considerations

1. He began the **American Newspaper Directory**.
2. He sold ads in his directory to newspapers so that they could recommend themselves to potential advertisers.

The contents of ads are based upon:

- 1. The strengths and weaknesses of the candidates.**
- 2. The strength and weaknesses of the opponent.**
- 3. Available funds.**
- 4. The nature of news coverage of the candidate.**
- 5. Public information and views of the candidate.**
- 6. The general artistic and aesthetic inclinations of the consultant.**

Four Cultural Frames

1. Idolatry (1890-1925)

- a. Advertising messages carried a strong tone of veneration about products.**
- b. This tone was generated by the industrial system's newly discovered sense of power and accomplishment.**
- c. The overt selling strategy include:**
 - (1) Narratives about products and their qualities.**
 - (2) Range of their potential uses and benefits.**
 - (3) Common-sense advantages in saving time, energy and money.**
- d. The messages were quasi-logical because:**
 - (1) Surface appearance of the text concealed vital qualitative differences between products on the one hand and simply fraudulent and sometimes even dangerous ones on the other.**
 - (2) Patent-medicine advertising made unfounded claims.**

2. Iconology (1925-1945)

- a. The focal point swung toward the person as intended user away from the object as an independent entity.
- b. Qualities of good were cast in more abstract and suggestive terms.
 - (1) Automobiles were expressions of a modern outlook.
 - (2) Soaps were expressions of integrity and caring.
 - (3) Shoes were expressions of sobriety or status.

3. Narcissism (1945-1965)

- a. Consumers were encouraged to consider what the product could do for them, personally and selfishly.
- b. A prominent theme in ads was images of control over other people's judgments exerted with the product's assistance.
- c. Period has been labeled "black magic."

4. Totemism (1965- Present)

- a. The identifying features of the three preceding periods are recalled and synthesized.
- b. Consumption is meant to be a spectacle, a public enterprise.
- c. Product-related images fulfill their totemic potential in becoming emblems for social collectivities, principally by means of their associations with lifestyles.
- d. Today's totems (product images) themselves are badges of group members.

The Seven Basic Functions of Political Ads

- 1. To create interest in the candidate.**
- 2. To build name recognition.**
- 3. To stimulate citizen participation.**
- 4. To provide motivation for candidate support.**
- 5. To identify key issues and frame questions for public debate.**
- 6. To demonstrate talents of the candidate.**
- 7. To provide entertainment.**

**DictATORS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:
GOVERNMENT, MEDIA, AND SOCIETY**

- A. Dictators of Freedom of Expression During Wartime
 - 1. The Civil War: Classic Case of Abolition (Newspapers)
 - 2. World War I: The Senseless War (Newspapers and Radio)
 - 3. War War II: War to End All Wars (Newspapers and Radio)
 - 4. The Vietnam War: Beer, Hamburger and Blood (Newspapers, Radio and Television)
- B. Dictator of Freedom of Expression at Home: Joseph McCarthy
- C. Peacetime National Security Through Prior Restraint
 - 1. The Pentagon Papers
 - 2. The Selling of the Pentagon
- D. Crises in Credibility: Watergate

THE CIVIL WAR: A CLASSIC CASE OF ABOLITION

Three Stages in the Development of Civil War Military Censorship

1. Denial by the Post Office of messages sent to enemy areas.
2. Censor taken from the State Department and put under the direction of the Secretary of War.
3. Total cooperation by the press from 1864 to the end of the war.

WORLD WAR I: THE SENSELESS WAR

A. Propaganda Efforts

1. President Wilson appointed a Committee on Public Information that would have the following purposes:
 - (a) Disseminate facts about the war.
 - (b) Coordinate government propaganda efforts.
 - (c) Drew up voluntary censorship code.
2. President Wilson appoints George Creel to direct the Committee on Public Information

B. Censorship Efforts

1. The Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 which:
 - (a) Opened the wedge for suppression of those considered disloyal to the American Allied war cause.
 - (b) Imposed heavy fines and imprisonment for willful making of false reports or false statements with the intent to interfere with the successful operation of the military or naval forces.
 - (c) Empowered the postmaster to declare unmailable all letters, circulars, newspaper, pamphlets, books and other materials violating provisions of the act.

2. The Trading-With-The-Enemy Act of October 1917 which:

- (a) Authorized censorship of all communications moving in or out of the United States.
- (b) Provided that translations of newspapers or magazine articles published in foreign languages could be demanded by the Post Office.

3. The Sedition Act of May 1918 which:

- (a) Made it a crime to write or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous or abusive language about the form of government of the United States or the Constitution, military or naval forces, flag or the uniform or to use language intended to bring these ideas and institutions into contempt, scorn, contumely or disrepute.
- (b) Gave the postmaster immense powers.

WORLD WAR II: THE WAR TO END ALL WARS

A. Censorship Efforts

1. The Office of Censorship was instituted which:
 - (a) Instituted voluntary press censorship.
 - (b) Mandatory censorship of mail, cables, and radio communications between the United States and other countries.
2. Byron Price, executive news editor of the AP was named director of the Office of Censorship.

B. Propaganda Efforts

1. The Office of War Information was instituted which:

(a) Was directed to tell the American people the following:

(1) How the war was going, where it was going, and where it came from.

(2) How the U.S. government was conducting it.

(3) What the U.S. government hoped to get out of victory.

(b) Functioned as a city desk for the nation's war news.

(c) Cooperated with the War and Navy Departments in handling military news, and the Army and Navy were required to consult with Davis about withholding specific military information.

(d) Offered weekly news digests, columns, cartoons to the press.

2. Elmer Davis was appointed to be director of the Office of War Information.

THE VIETNAM WAR: A HAMBURGER, BEER, AND BLOOD

A. History of U.S. Involvement

1. Ho Chi Minh proclaimed a Democratic Republic of Vietnam at Hanoi in 1945.
2. The French returned to Saigon in 1946 and engaged in hostilities with Ho's Viet Minh.
 - (a) The French install Ex emperor Bao Dai as chief of state in Saigon.
 - (b) The French obtained financial aid from the United States in 1950--at the time of the Korean Crisis.
 - (c) The United States carried up to 80 percent of the costs, but the French were humiliated at Dienbienphu.
3. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 were enacted to:
 - (a) End hostilities.
 - (b) Provide for the partitioning of Vietnam at the 17th parallel.
 - (c) Reunification of Vietnam through national elections in 1956.
4. The Bao Dai government did not sign the agreement or honor it.
5. The United States created the SEATO alliance and included South Vietnam in the protected areas.

6. Premier Ngo Dinh Diem ousted Bao Dai and:
 - (a) Refused to allow the elections.
 - (b) Obtained the help of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group to train his army beginning in 1955.
7. Diem's opposition in South Vietnam formed the National Liberation Front and its guerrilla force--called the Viet Cong.
8. More U.S. military advisers go to Vietnam.
 - (a) In 1960, 686 American military advisers are in Vietnam.
 - (b) In 1961, 3,200 American military adviser are in Vietnam
9. Diem, his sister-in-law Mme. Nhu and the ruling Catholic party become increasingly oppressive.
10. The Buddhist uprising of 1963 in Saigon brought a coup and the death of Diem.
11. The American supporters, now transformed into a U.S> Military Assistance Command with 16,300 men, took over military affairs as 10 Saigon governments came and went in the next 18 months.
12. Gen. William Westmoreland became the American commander in Saigon in 1964 and remained until the Paris peace talk were begun in 1968.
 - (a) He institutes the twin search and destroy policy.
 - (b) His policy also includes bombing the North.

B. Government (Military) Vs. the Press

1. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara employed the famed "body-count" statistic to prove the enemy was being exhausted.
2. Minute reports of "precision bombing" of enemy convoys, roads, factories and troop concentration at an unprecedented saturation level.

C. The Press Vs. the Public

1. Time in 1963 attacked the Saigon press corps as propagandists plotting to overthrow the Diem government through distorted reporting.
2. Noted journalists fought back attacks on the integrity of the press by writing books and giving public lectures.
 - (a) They included:
 - (1) David Halberstam
 - (2) Neil Sheehan
 - (3) Malcome Browne
 - (b) They wrote about:
 - (1) The nature of the Vietnamese conflict.
 - (2) The danger of U.S. national interest of a "win at any cost" policy there.

3. Morley Safer in August 1965 and two Vietnamese photographers shot "The Burning of the Village of Cam Ne."

(a) It showed how U.S. Marines, in retaliation of being fired upon, leveled the 150 homes in the village.

(b) The action wounded three women, killed one baby, wounded one Marine and netted four old men as prisoners, Safer told the TV audience.

4. Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times began filing stories from Hanoi.

(a) His observations directly contradicted much of the claimed success of the U.S. bombing program.

(b) His work made Americans question the credibility of the press.

D. The Government Vs. the Press

1. The Nixon Administration fought back using Vice president Spiro Agnew.

(a) He said networks and newspapers exercised too powerful an influence over public opinion.

(b) He criticized network managements using commentators with a preponderant "Eastern Establishment bias" and for failing to provide a "wall of separation" between news and comment."

2. Never before had such a high federal official made such direct attacks on those reporting and commenting on the news.

RADIO AND ITS PROMISE

30
R. 3
Unit 4

A. The Development of Radio

1. Phase One: Radiotelephonic Communication
2. Phase Two: Pooling During World War I
3. Phase Three: Radio Stations
4. Phase Four: Industrial Firms Interested in Communications
5. Phase Five: The Radio Corporation of America
6. Phase Six: The Networks
7. Phase Seven: Federal Regulation: The FCC

B. Intermedia Competition

C. Radio Entertainment

D. Radio Entertainment Makes News: War of the Worlds

E. Entering World War II

Ingredients of Radiotelephony

1. Electricity: Thomas Edison's contribution
2. Telegraphy: Samuel F.B. Morse and his electromagnetic telegraph system
3. Telephony: Alexander Graham Bell and his telephone
 - a. James Clerk Maxwell discovers radio waves
 - b. Heinrich Hertz demonstrates the existence of radio waves
4. Wireless Telegraphy: Marconi's device
 - a. Reginald A. Fessenden is first to use continuous waves to carry a voice or music
 - b. Lee "Father of Radio" De Forest discovers the audio tube to transmit voice

Radio Broadcasting Develops as a Marketing Tool

Radio broadcasting betins as a means of promoting other enterprises:

- 1. A department store selling crystal sets.**
- 2. A company wishing to make radios.**
- 3. A newspaper expanding its domain.**

How \$hould Pay for Broadcasting

1. **Wealthy individuals should endow stations.**
2. **Cities and states should operate stations out
of tax revenues.**
3. **A common fund should be established to receive
contributions that would be distributed to stations.**
4. **Receivers or tubes should be taxed or licensed.**

Industrial Firms Contribute to Radio's Growth

A. Radio Corporation of America

1. Three firms form RCA

- a. American Telephone & Telegraph
- b. Westinghouse
- c. General Electric

2. They buy another firm: British Marconi

B. Firms Struggle for Control of Radio

- 1. RCA holds the trump cards
- 2. Who should pay for radio?

Communications Act of 1934

1. Established the seven-member Federal Communications Commission.
2. Took over jurisdiction of all telecommunications.
3. Responsibility of license holders to operate in the public interest was spelled out.
4. Empowered with ability to refuse renewal of a license.
5. Forbade any attempt at censorship.

HISTORY OF TELEVISION

- A. Television in the Age of America in Transition
- B. Television's Early Developments
- C. Television Arrives
- D. Early TV Entertainment
 - 1. Local Programming
 - 2. Network Programming
 - 3. Changes in Entertainment Programming
 - 4. Decade of Shame: Entertainment Programs Under Investigation
- E. Television Journalism
 - 1. The First Broadcasters
 - 2. Murrow and Friendly: Architects of Broadcast Journalism
- F. Television in American Culture

Television in the Age of Transition in America

A. The National Setting

1. The United States becomes the world's #1 power.
2. Confusion and expectation accompany end of rationing and shortages.
3. Military personnel flood the home market.
4. Millions of war-delayed marriages are celebrated.
5. Industry endures union-management arguments and strikes.
6. Postwar inflation grows.
7. Hollywood hunts for communists.

B. The International Setting

1. United States is caught in international transition.
2. The Cold War reaches the flashpoint.
3. The Korean War erupts.

TELEVISION'S EARLY DEVELOPMENTS: MECHANICAL SCANSION

A. PAUL NIPKOW

1. In 1884, he invents a device to scan pictures.
2. His work set off a whole line of research based on mechanical scansion.
3. Three would perfect his work on mechanical TV: Herbert E. Ives; John Baird, and Charles Francis Jenkins.

B. HERBERT E. IVES

1. In 1927, he transmitted still and moving pictures over hundreds of miles.
2. He was instrumental in developing methods for relaying TV images by coaxial cable and radio.
3. He also invented a camera that could be used outdoors.

C. JOHN L. BAIRD

1. He is credited with establishing TV in England in 1926.
2. He used a mechanical scanning system of his own design.
3. In 1928, he televised a woman's image from London to New York, using a shortwave band.

D. CHARLES FRANCIS JENKINS

1. He attempted to develop a mechanical system for commercial use that was dependent on a number of moving parts.
2. In 1923, he used wireless to send the image of a photograph of President Harding from Washington to Philadelphia.
3. His system could transmit 60 lines resolution, compared to Ives's 48 lines and the 525 lines currently used in the United States.

TELEVISION'S EARLY DEVELOPMENTS: ELECTRONIC SCANSION

A. VLADIMIR ZWORYKIN

1. In 1926 he invented the Kinescope (cathode ray tube).
2. His invention would be the core of a receiving unit.
3. He joins the large RCA research team.

B. PHILO FARNSWORTH

1. In 1922, he outlines a system of all-electronic television
2. He devised a way to obtain a picture with a 100-150-line definition. _____

TELEVISION AS A FORCE IN AMERICAN LIFE

Cultural Trends Influenced by TV

1. Leisure and Entertainment.
2. A Homegenized National Culture.
3. Social and Cultural Values.
4. Learning and Emotional Development.
5. Television and Politics.

CHANGES IN ENTERTAINMENT PROGRAMMING

A. WILLIAM PALEY AND CBS

1. Philosophy: Get the biggest stars.
2. Captures lead in prime-time ratings.

B. SYLVESTER L. (PAT) WEAVER AND NBC

1. Philosophy: Magazine concept.
2. Advances the "Spectacular."

C. ROONE ARLEDGE AND ABC

1. Philosophy: Sports coverage.
2. Acquired Sports Programs, Inc.

Numbers of Radio and Television Stations and Sets in Use

YEAR	AM STATIONS (on the air)	FM STATIONS	TV STATIONS	RADIO SETS (millions)	TV SETS
1930	612				
1935	605			13	
1940	814			30	
1945	943			51	
1950	2086	53	9	60	(8000)
1955	2669	733	97	80	6
1960	3398	552	439	115	33
1965	4009	688	573	156	55
1970	4269	1270	586	228	61
1975	4463	2476	872	303	84
1980	4575	3571	962	413	120
1985	4805	4350	1020	456	150
		5066	1220	489	180

Source: *Broadcasting Yearbooks*. Radios were in 96 percent of all households in the United States in 1950, 98.6 percent in 1970. Television household figures were 13 percent in 1950, 68 percent in 1955, 98 percent in 1985. Of the 489 million radio sets in 1985, 269 million were in homes, and 220 million were out of homes. The 1987 figures for stations were AM, 4867; FM, 5209; TV, 1297.

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Comm425 Fall 88 - Media History

- 1 09/29/1988 - Forerunners of the American Mass Media
- 2 09/19/1988 - Penny Press

2.1 GIANTS

2.1.1 Horace Greeley

2.1.1.1 Greeley promised:

2.1.1.1.1 appeal to the laboring class

2.1.1.1.2 adv moral, social

2.1.1.2 Editorially, Greeley advocated:

2.1.1.2.1 a protective tariff for industry

2.1.1.2.2 a national bank and sound currency

2.1.1.2.3 internal improvements, such as highways, canals,
railroads

2.1.1.2.4 land reforming, the opening of cheap western lands

supported -isms:

philosophy of French, Charles Fourier, Fourierism, helping poor people. Civil war---supported Lincoln throughout . . . didn't believe US should be divided. Charles Dana, G. editor, meets Marx, gave Marx a job for NY Tribune, ed. page for all different views.

2.1.1.3 contributions

2.1.1.3.1 to demonstrate and can publish a cheap daily void of sensationalism

2.1.1.3.2 proved that a cheap, popular paper need not be
oikutucak neutral

2.1.1.3.3 showed that newspaper could reflect needs and problems
of urban commercial/industrial worker

2.1.1.3.4 sought to solve problems of machine age in American

2.1.1.3.5 revealed how the newspaper might channel new ideas and
viewpoints to the public in a democracy

2.1.1.3.6 reestablishment the value of the editorial page

2.1.1.3.7 acquired an outstanding editorial staff

2.1.1.3.8 managed to maintain a literary character in Tribune

2.1.1.3.9 set or the prune a high standard & spirit of reform

2.1.2 Henry Raymond

2.1.2.1 editor of Tribune, worked for Greeley, u. of vermont, New York Times

2.1.2.2 contributions

2.1.2.2.1 founded New York Times---developed reasonable decency in public reporting

2.1.2.2.2 news was invariably fair in tone . . .

if not in content, and no rival equ

2.2 THE STORY JOURNALISM OF HEARST AND PULITZER

2.2.1 Characteristic of Gilded Age of Journalism (post civil war)

2.2.1.1 high birth rate, heavy immigration

2.2.1.2 econ expansion

2.2.1.3 labor organizes nationally

2.2.1.4 politics of period reflect industirial

2.2.1.5 city life reflected in press

2.2.1.6 baseball, new stages plays, vaudeville

2.2.1.7 more women read news

2.2.1.8 evening editions outdistance morning issues

2.2.1.9 sunday editions become popular

2.2.1.10 great socio-econ problems by novelists and writers

2.2.1.11 scientific progress is notable

2.2.1.12 newspaper personnel expand

2.2.2 Story Journalism & Information Journalism

2.2.2.1 Story Journalism:

record facts and makes it into story

2.2.2.2 Information Journalism

facts becomes the

Skim over the 3 chapters and be prepared to discuss the Reagan Presidency and the media. Use this material for background to our discussions.

"ALL THESE KILLERS"

"WE HAVE BEEN kinder to President Reagan than any President that I can remember since I've been at the *Post*."

So said Benjamin C. Bradlee, executive editor of *The Washington Post*, some four months before the November 1984 re-election of Ronald Reagan. Three years later, after the Iran-contra affair had shattered Mr. Reagan's previous image of invincibility, I asked the legendary editor if he still stood by his statement. He did. Stressing that this was "all totally subconscious," Bradlee explained that when Ronald Reagan came to Washington in 1980, journalists at the *Post* sensed that "here comes a really true conservative. . . . And we are known—though I don't think justifiably—as the great liberals. So, [we thought] we've got to really behave ourselves here. We've got to not be arrogant, make every effort to be informed, be mannerly, be fair. And we did this. I suspect in the process that this paper and probably a good deal of the press gave Reagan not a free ride, but they didn't use the same standards on him that they used on Carter and on Nixon."

Even with all that eventually went wrong—the Iran-contra scandal, the stock-market crash, the seemingly endless series of criminal investigations of former top White House officials—the overall press coverage of the Reagan administration was extraordinarily positive. It is rare indeed for public officials to express satisfaction with their press coverage—in the words of NBC News White House correspondent Andrea Mitchell, "Politicians always say they want a fair press, when what they really want is a positive press"—but the men in charge of media and public relations in the Reagan White House were, almost unanimously, quite pleased with how their President was treated.

James Baker, White House chief of staff during the first term

and Secretary of the Treasury during the second, told me, "There were days and times and events we might have some complaint about, [but] on balance and generally speaking, I don't think we had anything to complain about in terms of first-term press coverage."

David Gergen, former White House director of communications, confirmed shortly after leaving the administration in January 1984 that President Reagan and most of his advisers had come to believe that the basic goal of their approach to the news media—"to correct the imbalance of power with the press so that the White House will once again achieve a 'margin of safety'"—had finally been attained.

Most expansive of all was Michael Deaver, the first-term deputy chief of staff and a virtual surrogate son to the Reagans. Deaver wrote in his memoirs that up until the Iran-contra scandal broke, "Ronald Reagan enjoyed the most generous treatment by the press of any President in the postwar era. He knew it, and liked the distinction."*

How Reagan managed to elude critical news coverage for so long baffled many political observers, not least news executives and journalists themselves.

"I don't know how to explain why he hasn't been as vulnerable to the onslaught of the American press as some previous Presidents; it is a hard subject for me," said ABC News executive vice president David Burke. Agreeing with Ben Bradlee about the extraordinary kindness of Reagan's press coverage, he continued, "I wonder why. It isn't because he intimidates us. It isn't that he blows us away with logic. So what the hell is it?"

Burke, a former top aide to Senator Edward Kennedy, finally settled on a variation of the Great Communicator theory, long favored by journalists and White House aides alike for explaining Reagan's positive public image. The key, in this view, was Reagan himself. His personal gifts—an amiable personality, sincere manner, perfect vocal delivery and photogenic persona—made him the television era equivalent of the Pied Piper of Hamelin; he

* Even traditional right-wing press bashers were apparently not displeased with Reagan news coverage during the first six years of his presidency. A Gallup poll conducted in June 1985 found that only 21 percent of respondents who described themselves as "strong conservatives" felt that news organizations had been unfair to their President. Even during the Iran-contra scandal, that figure increased only to 42 percent.

played a tune so gay and skipped ahead so cheerily that others could not help but trust and follow him. To attack such a man was unthinkable. "You just can't get the stomach to go after the guy," explained Burke. "It's not a popularity thing, it's not that we're afraid of getting the public mad at us. I think it is a perception that the press has in general of Reagan, that he is a decent man. He is not driven by insecurities, by venality, by conspiracies and back-room tactics."

Tom Brokaw, anchor and managing editor of the *NBC Nightly News*, also felt that Reagan got "a more positive press than he deserves," a feat for which Brokaw credited the White House staff as well as the President. "In part it goes back to who he is," said Brokaw, "and his strong belief in who he is. He's not trying to reinvent himself every day as Jimmy Carter was. . . . Ronald Reagan reminds me of a lot of CEOs I know who run big companies and spend most of their time on their favorite charitable events or lunch with their pals and kind of have a broad-based philosophy of how they want their companies run. Reagan's got that kind of broad-based philosophy about how he wants the government run, and he's got all these killers who are willing and able to do that for him."

The "killers" primarily responsible for generating positive press coverage of Reagan were Michael Deaver and David Gergen, and if they did not exactly get away with murder, they came pretty close. Deaver, Gergen and their colleagues effectively rewrote the rules of presidential image-making. On the basis of a sophisticated analysis of the American news media—how it worked, which buttons to push when, what techniques had and had not worked for previous administrations—they introduced a new model for packaging the nation's top politician and using the press to sell him to the American public. Their objective was not simply to tame the press but to transform it into an unwitting mouthpiece of the government; it was one of Gergen's guiding assumptions that the administration simply could not govern effectively unless it could "get the right story out" through the "filter" of the press.

The extensive public relations apparatus assembled within the Reagan White House did most of its work out of sight—in private White House meetings each morning to set the "line of the day" that would later be fed to the press; in regular phone calls to the television networks intended to influence coverage of Reagan on

the evening news; in quiet executive orders imposing extraordinary new government secrecy measures, including granting the FBI and CIA permission to infiltrate the press. It was Mike Deaver's special responsibility to provide a constant supply of visually attractive, prepackaged news stories—the kind that network television journalists in particular found irresistible. Of course, it helped enormously that the man being sold was an ex-Hollywood actor. As James Lake, press secretary of the Reagan-Bush '84 campaign, acknowledged, Ronald Reagan was “the ultimate presidential commodity . . . the right product.”

The Reagan public relations model was based on a simple observation, articulated to me by longtime Reagan pollster Richard Wirthlin: “There’s no question that how the press reports [on] the President influences how people feel about the President. People make up their minds on the basis of what they see and hear about him, and the press is the conduit through which they get a lot of their information.” Because the news media were the unavoidable intermediary between the President and the public, Wirthlin, Deaver, Gergen, Baker and their colleagues focused their talents on controlling to the maximum extent possible what news reports said about the President and his policies. The more influence they could exercise over how Reagan’s policies were portrayed in the press, the greater were the White House’s chances of implementing those policies without triggering widespread disaffection or endangering Mr. Reagan’s re-election chances.

To be sure, Reagan’s was hardly the first administration to establish a public relations apparatus within the White House. But few, if any, administrations had exalted news management to as central a role in the theory and practice of governance as Reagan’s did. Leslie Janka, a deputy White House press secretary, who resigned in protest after the administration excluded the press from the Grenada invasion, went so far as to say, “The whole thing was PR. This was a PR outfit that became President and took over the country. And to the degree then to which the Constitution forced them to do things like make a budget, run foreign policy and all that, they sort of did. But their first, last and overarching activity was public relations.”

What made relations with the press especially vital to the success of Reagan’s presidency was the fact that much of his agenda

was at odds with popular sentiment. On the basic political issues of his day, Ronald Reagan was much farther to the right than the majority of his fellow citizens. (Contrary to the widely accepted conventional wisdom of the time, American mass opinion in the late 1970s and early 1980s was not galloping to the right. As political economists Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers have demonstrated, public opinion was shifting, if anything, slightly leftward during that period, with Reagan’s policies themselves apparently providing some of the impetus.)

Reagan’s 1981 economic recovery program, for example, combined significant cuts in social spending and federal regulations with fantastic tax reductions aimed overwhelmingly at the very wealthiest Americans. In the name of free enterprise, the administration advocated a massive subsidy program for America’s corporations and rich citizens—not an easy thing to sell to average working- and middle-class Americans. Yet Reagan emerged from his first presidential summer gloriously triumphant, with Capitol Hill Democrats and Washington reporters alike convinced—falsely, as it happened—that he was the most popular President in decades.

The Reagan model worked so well that the relationship between the White House and the press will never be the same again. Long after Ronald Reagan has left the White House, the model of news management introduced during his tenure will remain behind, shaping press coverage and therefore public perception. Republican and Democratic candidates alike are relying on elements of the Reagan model in their respective quests for the presidency in 1988, and it is virtually certain to inform the media strategy of whoever succeeds Reagan as President in 1989.

David Gergen was so proud of what the Reagan apparatus accomplished that he told me it would be “worthwhile to institutionalize some of the approaches Reagan has taken toward press events, in order to make it work” for future Presidents. Jody Powell, President Carter’s press secretary, and a man who knew a thing or two himself about manipulating the press, was convinced that future administrations would indeed copy the Reagan strategy of news management, but argued that the American people would be the poorer for it.

“There are a lot of people going to school on this administration,” said Powell, “and one of the lessons is that the press’s bark

is much worse than its bite. They'll huff and puff around, but in the end you can cut severely into the flow of information and manage it with a much firmer hand than we were able or willing to do. . . . If you as much as say to the administration, which is what the press is doing, 'Look, you can do this and there's not a damn thing we can do about it,' they're damn sure going to do it. It's too much of a temptation for frail mortals to bear."

Understanding the Reagan propaganda operation is essential if Americans are to make sense of what happened to their country and their politics during the Reagan era. But there is more to the story than slick skulduggery on the part of power-hungry politicians. Precisely because the Reagan PR model seems destined to become an enduring feature of presidential politics in this country, it is crucial to examine how the American press responded to it. After all, in the U.S. system, it is the job of the press to find and present the truth despite officially erected obstacles. As Tom Brokaw commented, "I can't point my finger at [the Reagan White House]. I think they're doing what they need to do, and if there's a failure, it's ultimately the press's failure."

Most of the more than one hundred and fifty journalists and news executives interviewed for this book rejected the idea that Ronald Reagan had gotten a free ride from U.S. news organizations, even as they hastened to add that neither had the press been too tough on him. Like the baby bear's porridge in the children's fairy tale, press coverage of Reagan had been not too hot, not too cold, but just right. If Reagan was popular, argued members of the press, it was because the American people liked him, not because the press had not done its job.

But this self-absolution by members of the press was contradicted by none other than the Reagan men themselves. Proud as they were of their efforts on President Reagan's behalf, more than one of his senior advisers believed that the taming of the press was less the doing of the White House than of the press itself. "I think a lot of the Teflon came because the press was holding back," said David Gergen. "I don't think they wanted to go after him that toughly."

This book tells the story of how top officials in the Reagan White House went about taming the supposedly savage beast known as the press and using it for their own political purposes. But it also tells how leading journalists and news organizations,

with honorable individual exceptions, *allowed* themselves to be used. As much through voluntary self-censorship as through government manipulation, the press during the Reagan years abdicated its responsibility to report fully and accurately to the American people what their government was really doing. The result was not only a betrayal of American journalism's public trust but also an impoverished democracy. If these twin tragedies are to be reversed, we must begin by understanding how they came to pass.

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"IF THERE IS anything deficient about press coverage of the Reagan administration, and there of course is, it has to do simply with our own deficiencies and laziness, and no especial cleverness, or blandishments, or seductions, or threats on their part," asserted Meg Greenfield, the editorial-page editor of *The Washington Post*. "I think we in this newspaper are situated in an absolutely blessed position," she added. "We have a very supportive, journalistically minded management. We have a lot of dough. We have a lot of resources. We have a lot of really smart people. And we have the commanding newspaper position in the [nation's] capital. We can do any damn thing that is important that we have the wit to see and pursue. . . . I really think that anyone who works for this newspaper has every chance imaginable in journalism to go out and get the Story."

"The odds against us [in the press] are not overwhelming," declared *Washington Post* executive editor Ben Bradlee. "Their weapons are enormous, but we're not unarmed in this struggle, we're not unarmed." Beyond the extraordinary array of resources and the journalistic license mentioned by Ms. Greenfield, there was above all the simple fact that, collectively, the press exercised perhaps the greatest power there was in politics: the power to define reality, to say what was—and what was not—important at any given time. The three major television networks in particular could cause big trouble for the White House virtually anytime they wanted simply by focusing sustained attention on any of the scandals, inequities, dangerous or bankrupt policies or other shortcomings common to every Washington administration. True, they usually didn't, but the threat was always there.

All this made the news media a force to be reckoned with for any administration. Yet at the same time, the press's freedom to

operate as an independent force within the American political system was constrained by the environment in which mainstream journalists lived and worked. Adversarial behavior was discouraged by certain basic facts of journalistic life. For instance, as employees of some of the largest and most profitable corporations in the land, journalists and news executives ultimately answered to superiors whose individual and collective self-interest mitigated against strong or consistent criticism of a government as pro-corporate as Ronald Reagan's. There was also the age-old challenge of maintaining good and reliable sources without becoming a captive of them.

According to the old journalistic truism, a reporter was only as good as his sources. For White House reporters, this raised a troubling dilemma. Most news organizations' definition of proper White House coverage stressed reporting the views and actions of the President and his aides above all else. Thus the officials with whom reporters were, in theory, supposed to have an adversarial relationship were the very people upon whom they were most dependent for the information needed to produce their stories. As Lee Lescaze, who covered the White House for *The Washington Post* in 1981, explained, "There are only six or seven real sources in the White House who know anything. So you can't write a tough story if you're one of the 90 percent of the press corps who can be frozen out. . . . [Jim] Baker has three hundred phone message slips waiting for him, and he's going to call back the ones he likes or needs."

For obvious reasons, the White House propaganda apparatus concentrated its efforts on the big-circulation outlets: the major networks, the wire services and the big papers. "Anybody else," noted CBS White House correspondent Bill Plante, "can whistle 'Dixie.'"

White House officials recognized that television's commercial imperatives gave them a strategic edge. "I think by temperament, by inclination, by desire, [White House reporters] are highly adversarial," said one senior Reagan aide. "They are very smart. They are hardworking, by and large, the good ones. They simply have an extraordinarily difficult problem, because their subject, the President, is what the network wants to run."

The great demand for White House news stories meant that the Reagan media apparatus could sharply restrict reporters' ac-

cess, and thereby gain greater control over coverage, without inhibiting its own access to the nation's airwaves and newspapers. It meant that top White House officials could mount the stage in the West Wing pressroom and brief the entire press corps on a "background" basis—that is, their names would not be attached to any quoted statements—without eliciting a peep of protest from the journalists gathered below. It meant that President Reagan could be made available to cameras only under the most carefully controlled conditions but with utter confidence that his remarks would nonetheless be widely printed and broadcast.

"What the Reagan White House does is say you can't have access to the President and his principal aides; you'll write what we want you to," said Juan Williams of *The Washington Post*. "And instead of the press saying this is bullshit and pushing for more press conferences, more access of all kinds, they compete with one another to get that one interview or that one scoop."

"The reason this can go on is that the reporters on the White House beat have been deadened," said Vicki Barker, a United Press International Radio general assignment reporter who covered the White House during the summer of 1985. "It's like that scene in *A Clockwork Orange* where the droog is strapped into a chair with Beethoven blasting away at him and he's being re-programmed. That's the White House beat. [The administration] keeps up a steady drip-drop of [what is] barely news, and you have to scramble to keep up with it, because otherwise your editors ask why the competition has it."

"A lot of reporters recognized that they were dealing not with real news but pseudo-news," said Rich Jaroslovsky, a White House reporter for *The Wall Street Journal*. "[In private] network correspondents complain that a lot of it is bilge, but they still want that story to go on. They don't sit around on Air Force One asking why they're writing these stories. They know how the system works, and they accept it." As George Watson, Washington bureau chief of ABC News, commented, "We aren't consciously sitting around saying, 'How can we be more adversarial?'"

White House reporters were occupied with a much more immediate and pressing concern: getting the story, getting it first, and getting on the air or in the paper with it. As they had to be, one might add, if they were to keep their high-profile jobs. Why

should their bosses keep them on the beat and pay them along five-figure salaries—in the case of TV reporters, strong six-figure salaries—if they did not produce plenty of stories, or if they consistently got "beaten" by their competitors? There was also the goad of ego, which in the case of most White House correspondents was a powerful goad indeed. One did not rise as high within the journalistic profession as these reporters had if one did not really want to be—indeed, *have to be*—number one. Appearances on the evening news and the morning front page were a large part of keeping score in that contest.

Perhaps because he tended to be in the direct path of the stampeding herd, White House spokesman Larry Speakes complained that this collective urge on the reporters' part led to "distortion of the news. The correspondents never go back to their desk and say, 'There's no story here today.' . . . If Chris [Wallace of NBC] gets a piece for the evening news, then Andrea [Mitchell] has to find another angle on it to get it on the air [the next morning on the *Today* show]. And in some cases, the story gets distorted looking for that other angle. The next afternoon, Chris is looking to Sam [Donaldson] and Lesley [Stahl], so he's trying to figure out how he can hype it more and more and make sure he's got something a little bit more than they have."

Michael Deaver, on the other hand, believed that the pack mentality of the White House press corps played into his hands—it meant they tended to come to him and take what stories he offered. "You know, they'd be much better off if they were in offices scattered all over town," said Deaver. "But they beat on each other, and if they don't have a story, sure, they're going to take [ours]. Whereas if they were out on their own, they'd be hustling and digging and getting their own stories."

To be sure, the White House needed the major outlets as much as vice versa, but that did not necessarily embolden reporters at such news organizations. There was enough competitiveness on the White House beat so that even reporters with audience clout had to worry about being discriminated against. Coverage too sharply or consistently critical could well provoke White House officials into favoring one's rival with the next inside tip.

Lou Cannon, the White House correspondent for *The Washington Post*, was the journalist widely regarded as enjoying the closest contacts with high Reagan officials. Appropriately enough,

his stock-in-trade was stories revealing the inner workings of the Reagan White House. As Cannon's former editor William Greider explained, "What Lou lives for is that exclusive story that he gets not just twenty-four hours before anybody else but weeks before anybody else." Maintaining the kind of access that yielded such leaked stories, however, exacted a cost. Cannon's regular Monday column on the Reagan White House often contained wonderful inside stuff and useful insights available nowhere else. Unfortunately, it just as often was marred by an "on the one hand, on the other hand" point of view that greatly diluted the power of Cannon's information. Comments critical of the President were invariably balanced by an equal dose of approving remarks, resulting in essays that sounded eminently fair-minded to most of the reading public even as they preserved the author's special relationship with the Reagan White House.

According to Lee Lescaze, who said he "got on extremely well" with Cannon when they covered the White House together for the *Post* in 1981, Cannon was "very sympathetic" toward Reagan. "If [a reporter assigned to work with Cannon] began by saying to Lou, 'Look, you like Reagan, I don't. So you can write all the puff you want, but I'll still be tearing the lid off of it,' Lou would think he was dealing with a wild man. He'd want to keep control over the major pieces and make sure they were written with what he'd call the right sensitivity."

"As all my former and present editors know," responded Cannon, "I've got two imperatives in covering the White House: to be critical and to be fair." Noting that he spent most of 1981 on a leave of absence to complete his biography of Reagan, Cannon defended his toughness by recalling that his first story upon returning to the White House beat in January 1982 "ended by saying that the question about Ronald Reagan was the same that it was when he became President a year earlier: is he up to the job?" Cannon went on to complain that he had a hard time covering the Reagan administration precisely because he was so critical. And it was true: his coverage was relatively critical. But the emphasis belongs on the word "relatively." Lou Cannon ranked a notch above his peers because he occasionally engaged in what should have been standard practice: stating (albeit in carefully qualified language) the obvious about Ronald Reagan.

"It's hard to avoid the analogy of the White House press corps

as a bunch of caged hamsters thoroughly dependent on their masters for their daily feeding," remarked *The Boston Globe's* Walter Robinson, who was assigned to the beat in 1985. "There is so little real information there that people really do end up competing for crumbs. And they consider it a badge of honor to get one of the crumbs, even though most of them turn out to be not as nourishing as advertised."

In reaction to the intense competition, said Robinson, "people lower their standards [and] take single-source things that you'd never take in another kind of environment. . . . It's a generally held view within the press corps that the *New York Times* coverage of the White House is shameless. It's so important for the *Times* to be first that they throw their standards out the window. There's general resentment among other print reporters of the *Times* and the *Post* because of their access. It's so much easier for [second-term White House chief of staff] Donald Regan to drop something in there as a trial balloon, and then everybody else will pick it up." Beyond the front-page scoops, added Robinson, "the *Times* is also shameless with the fawning profiles of White House officials who will later be leaking stories [to the authors of said profiles]."

Tom Oliphant, Robinson's predecessor as the *Globe's* White House reporter, agreed that reporters at "second tier" news corporations were afforded less access to officials, but asked, "So what if you can't get Don Regan on the phone twice a week? I prefer this in some ways to being a *New York Times* reporter with official sources which produce official stories that are beside the point."

Fame and fortune, whether in the form of being read by the Washington power elite or perhaps being invited to join the Sunday talk-show panels, were powerful temptations to which White House reporters were especially susceptible. After all, they were members, in former NBC White House correspondent Emery King's words, of "the most pampered press corps in the world." And their position of privilege inevitably, if subtly, shaped their reporting. "There are no whores in the [White House] press corps," declared Tom Oliphant. "They're all independent journalists. They work hard. None of them want to report just what the White House says is true. But there is subtle entrapment. . . . The perks, the trips, the *life*, as they say, are more than any

human being should be expected to withstand. There are too many tender traps to report strongly there for long."

To be sure, some White House reporters resisted these traps more vigorously than others. Sam Donaldson of ABC, for example, was not one to pull punches for reasons of decorum. When White House press aides prevented reporters from getting close enough to the President to ask questions, Donaldson was not shy about shouting loud enough so that even the hard-of-hearing Mr. Reagan couldn't ignore the question. Donaldson was the man right-wing press bashers loved to hate, yet he was just as willing to hound Democrats as Republicans.

Yet not even Donaldson, probably the best television reporter covering the White House during the Reagan years, was genuinely as adversarial as commonly supposed. True, he was not afraid of challenging the official line, but he hardly made a habit of it. As befit a television journalist, his image as a mad dog was more a function of form than substance; the bark was much worse than the bite. Often, what was interpreted as hard-nosed reporting on his part had more to do with Donaldson's aggressive manner and nettlesome appearance than with the actual content of his reports, which usually were only marginally more adversarial than those of his colleagues.

Stan Opatowsky, director of political operations at ABC News and a man who worked closely with Donaldson years before he became a star, told me that to understand Sam Donaldson one had to bear in mind that he was really two persons: the loudmouth maverick of his public persona and the shrewd professional who is very much part of the establishment. *Hold On, Mr. President!*, Donaldson's 1987 autobiography, confirmed that analysis. For all his apparently outrageous behavior and growling aggressiveness, Sam Donaldson held to rather conventional opinions about news, politics and the connection between them. Which perhaps helps explain an apparent paradox: of the network correspondents on the White House beat, Donaldson was unanimously considered by the top Reagan press aides interviewed for this book to be the fairest of them all.

The sources dilemma was not quite as acute for reporters on beats other than the White House, if only because they tended to have a larger pool of potential sources on which to draw. Still, if they were to provide the kind of daily stories most desired by

their editorial and executive superiors, maintaining cordial relations with top government officials was an occupational necessity. As a foreign policy reporter, "you need to be on speaking terms with the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, or Soviet Affairs," said ABC national security correspondent John McWethy. But how likely was a reporter to stay on speaking terms with such officials if he was consistently engaged in full-bore adversarial journalism? President Reagan's Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Elliott Abrams, actually refused to take questions from or appear on talk shows or in public debates with certain journalists and policy analysts because he considered them politically biased. "It is time we begin to define what constitutes the borders of responsible criticism," Abrams told the *Columbia Journalism Review* in defending his refusal to grant an interview to CBS's Jane Wallace, who contributed some of the most aggressive reporting on Central America to appear on network television during the Reagan years. Because she was not restricted to the Central America beat, Ms. Wallace was not greatly harmed by Abrams's ban. But for journalists who did do the bulk of their reporting on that beat, such a blacklisting would have amounted to a significant competitive handicap.

"How do you develop sources on a beat without becoming captive to them? I don't know. It's one of the real dilemmas for any reporter," said Stephen Engelberg of *The New York Times*. Commenting on press coverage of the Iran-contra affair, Engelberg added, "That's why the people who have done the best on this story are those who came out of left field. [*Miami Herald* reporter Alfonso] Chardy didn't have to make the White House like him. Neither did [*Los Angeles Times* reporter Michael] Wines. . . . Ollie North was a Pulitzer waiting to happen for anybody on the White House or national security beat, but reporters are human beings. The fewer sources there are, the more you think about how they'll react to your story. You'll gore somebody's ox if you have to, but you'll think about it carefully beforehand."

. . .

DURING the late 1960s Jeff Gralnick was one of Walter Cronkite's favorite young producers at CBS News. When Cronkite made his

famous fact-finding journey to Vietnam following the Tet offensive of 1968, Gralnick had already been "in-country" seven or eight weeks, trying to figure out, as he later recalled, "whether I should be in front of the camera or behind it." It was in the latter capacity that he assisted in preparing what would be one of Cronkite's most important broadcasts ever: a special prime-time report in which Cronkite, who, like most other dominant news media voices in the United States, had thus far been quite supportive of the war, contradicted the Johnson administration's claims that the war was being won and suggested that the United States think about withdrawing. It was a half hour of television regarded by war supporters and critics alike, and indeed by Johnson himself, as a clear sign that mass American opinion was turning irreversibly against the war. And it was remarkable for another reason as well: Walter Cronkite, the man thought to embody objective journalism, had expressed a clear opinion in the broadcast; he had taken a stand *against* the government.

Fifteen years later, a mature Jeff Gralnick held one of the most powerful jobs in American television news: executive producer of ABC's *World News Tonight*. Naturally he answered to executive superiors in that job, but on a day-to-day basis it was he who exercised ultimate control over what stories appeared on *World News Tonight* and which correspondents and producers were assigned to report them, and over the length, emphasis and general tone of those stories. As the man who controlled the broadcast from September 1979 until July 1983, Gralnick decided what approximately twelve million Americans learned about their government and the world five nights a week during the first two and a half years of Ronald Reagan's presidency.

The journalistic philosophy he brought to the job differed considerably from that which had informed Cronkite's Vietnam broadcast years before. For example, when asked how he as executive producer responded to Reagan administration efforts to restrict journalists' access to Reagan, he replied, "It's not my job to respond to it. . . . It is not my position to say, 'For shame, Public Agency.' It's my job to take the news as they choose to give it to us and then, in the amount of time that's available, put it into the context of the day or that particular story." Later in the same interview, Gralnick declared, "The evening newscast is not supposed to be the watchdog on the government. It never

was, never will be. We are a national front page, five days a week."

When asked about Lou Cannon's belief that President Reagan had gotten "a fairer press than he deserves," Gralnick shot back, "I wouldn't consider talking about what the President does or does not deserve. It's a political, subjective judgment."

"Aren't those kinds of judgments made in anyone's journalism?"

"Better not be. *The Village Voice* may make those kinds of judgments, but I sure as hell don't."

Asked finally whether he was saying that *The Village Voice* had a point of view while such mainstream news organizations as *The New York Times* and ABC News did not, the network vice president seemed suddenly impatient. Grabbing that morning's *Times* from under a pile of papers on his desk, he held it up with both hands, nodded toward the fully extended front page and in a schoolteacher tone explained, "On its front page the only point of view exhibited by *The New York Times* is the view of what stories are on the right-hand lead, the left-hand lead, above and below the fold." He then ripped through the paper's front section, flung it open to the opinions and editorials page, smacked the page with the back of his hand and announced, "That is where *The New York Times's* point of view is."

"He is either very naïve or a real liar," responded television critic Tom Shales of *The Washington Post*. "For Jeff Gralnick to say no political judgments go into those broadcasts is just silly."

"*The New York Times* is a very good newspaper with lots of good reporters, but to say it's value-free I think is wrong," offered Bill Wheatley, then senior (and later promoted to executive) producer of the *NBC Nightly News*. "There are values expressed just by what stories are placed on the front page, by what facts lead the story and what facts are in the middle of the story."

"'Objectivity' contradict[s] the essentially subjective nature of journalism," wrote former *Post* editor Ben Bagdikian in his landmark 1983 study, *The Media Monopoly*. "Every basic step in the journalistic process involves a value-laden decision: Which of the infinite number of events in the environment will be assigned for coverage and which ignored? Which of the infinite observations confronting the reporter will be noted? . . . Which story will be prominently displayed on page 1 and which buried inside or dis-

carded? . . . 'Objectivity' place[s] overwhelming emphasis on established, official voices and tend[s] to leave unreported large areas of genuine relevance that authorities choose not to talk about."

Objectivity also prohibited reporters from exercising much intelligence and judgment on behalf of their readers, according to author and former *New York Times* reporter David Halberstam. Reflecting on news coverage of the 1972 presidential campaign, Halberstam once wrote: "Despite all the fine talk of objectivity, the only thing that mildly approached objectivity was the form in which the reporter wrote the news, a technical style which required the journalist to appear to be much dumber and more innocent than in fact he was. So he wrote in a bland, uncritical way which gave greater credence to the utterances of public officials, no matter how mindless these utterances. . . . Thus the press voluntarily surrendered a vast amount of its real independence; it treated the words and actions of the government of the United States with a credence that those words and actions did not necessarily merit."

Notwithstanding such criticisms, objectivity remained the dominant journalistic philosophy in the United States throughout the Reagan years. True, few articulated so extreme a version of that philosophy as did Jeff Gralnick. In the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate, objectivity had come under sufficient criticism from within the profession so that now most journalists, if pushed, would concede that perfect objectivity was impossible; explicitly or implicitly, every news story unavoidably expressed a point of view. As NBC News Washington bureau chief Robert McFarland pointed out: "Do you lead your newscast with the story of how inflation is falling, or how unemployment is still 14 percent in Detroit? That's a value judgment."

The value judgments American journalists made in reporting the news were inevitably influenced by their own backgrounds. "Even as an objective journalist, you're an American first and a journalist second," observed *CBS Evening News* Washington producer Susan Zirinsky. "You come from a framework to every story, and I'm an American, that's where I come from." Former ABC Pentagon correspondent Dean Reynolds made a similar point when I asked why the press had generally refrained from highlighting the obvious potential of President Reagan's Strategic

Defense Initiative space weapons system to function as a first-strike nuclear weapon. Reynolds said that he and other reporters had asked Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger about this possibility. "And he ultimately falls back on 'Well, you have to look at the two systems [the United States versus the Soviet Union]. Which one do you believe?' That's a pretty fundamental question. And I believe this administration and this Defense Secretary [when they] say we are not attempting to build a first-strike weapon."

Even journalists who rejected simplistic notions of value-free news nevertheless usually embraced more refined versions of the doctrine of objectivity. If it was impossible to avoid a point of view entirely, they would do their best to minimize it. As much as possible, they would leave explanations and interpretations to others. They would strive for "fairness" and "balance" (the two buzzwords that had arisen to replace "objectivity" in the journalistic lexicon). They would, above all, remain politically neutral.

In accordance with their avoidance of partisanship, many journalists seemed to regard strenuous challenging of the government as an improper violation of the rules of objectivity. Honest adversarial journalism they equated with, and often dismissed as, "advocacy" journalism. NBC's Tom Brokaw was but one of those who argued that it was not the press's job to protect the public from White House efforts to manipulate opinion; rather, the press was to share with the public "the biggest, most thorough picture of what [the White House] is up to in the policy and the manipulation, and let the public respond to that."

As much as any other constraint, it was this allegiance to objectivity that put the press at such a strategic disadvantage vis-à-vis the Reagan White House. Whatever it promised in theory, in practice objective journalism was far from politically neutral, largely because of its overwhelming reliance on official sources of information. In fact, in its own way, it was no less slanted than the advocacy journalism that mainstream reporters and editors so self-righteously shunned. It was just that its slant was in deference, rather than opposition, to the reigning conventions and authorities of the day.

"Objectivity is fine if it's real," said independent journalist I. F. Stone. "Every society has its dogmas, and a genuinely ob-

jective approach can break through them. But most of the time objectivity is just the rationale for regurgitating the conventional wisdom of the day. If what you're saying challenges the stereotypes of the day, it's hard to get it printed."

It was an article of faith within the American press that everyone was free to say whatever they liked; there were no limits on opinion, and all serious views were given fair representation. In fact, however, subtle but definite limits were imposed on the nation's political debate by the press's definition of who constituted responsible, and thus quotable, news sources. As a practical matter, the definition of who was worth listening to was limited to official Washington: administration officials (past and present), members of Congress, the occasional well-connected academic specialist. "What you see are the people who are the movers and shakers, who have the power to change things in the short term," explained Sanford Socolow, former executive producer of the *CBS Evening News*. "They're the ones you see on the news."

Emphasizing the statements and actions of officials above all else often resulted in woefully one-sided reporting and reduced the press to little more than a nominally independent mouthpiece of the government, a stenographer to power. Especially on the White House beat, so-called objective reporting tended to produce news stories comprised largely of information reflecting the White House's own point of view—what (unnamed) official X thought about issue Y, what the President planned to tell foreign leader Z next week. Occasionally these views would be balanced by alternative voices, but in most cases, only marginally so. In the words of venerable *New York Times* Washington columnist James Reston: "What we do most of the time is, we really are a transmission belt." Noting that the White House would "like us to be even more of a transmission belt than we already are," he added, "Probably we should be analyzing more than we do."

Or at least relying on a more politically diverse range of sources. "Serving as a stenographer to power isn't real objectivity," argued Robert Parry, a reporter who worked for the Associated Press and *Newsweek* during the Reagan years. "Real objectivity means listening to all sides of the debate. Many reporters won't deal with certain kinds of information because of where it comes from—say, from people who are sympathetic to the Sandinistas. I've been accused of being non-objective for that reason. But I

think I'm being truly objective. I think you deal with *all* sides equally, evaluate their information, and if it checks out, you print it."

Former *Washington Post* assistant managing editor William Greider argued that the tendency of the press to serve as "more conduit than critic of the government" was due to an "ingrown quality of deference which makes the press unwilling to challenge presidential announcements. As a result, the press will print and broadcast reams and reams of rhetoric they themselves know to be wrong. Sure, they'll challenge him if he's got his facts 180 degrees wrong, but otherwise they're very reluctant."

"In the media at large there is no intellectual center of gravity," explained Robert Kaiser of the *Post*. "The practicing Washington press corps lacks intellectual self-confidence; [it] is most uncomfortable standing up and saying, 'Hey, naked, not so, stupid policy, dumb idea, whatever. If you talked to Lebanon experts about [the 1983 Reagan policy of] using U.S. marines as part of a peace-keeping mission, you knew it was a stupid policy from day one. But reporters don't do that. They cover it as a spectacle, as a political event: What are they saying up on the Hill?'"

Presidential assistant Richard Darman told me that the so-called Teflon phenomenon—the fact that blame never seemed to stick to President Reagan, even after such disasters as the Beirut suicide bombing that claimed the lives of 241 marines—was directly related to journalists' tendency to emphasize personality over substance. "It doesn't ever say this explicitly," said Darman, "but what their [journalistic] culture tells them is: Your job, when a proposal is launched, is to talk about who did what to whom making it get launched, who's fighting with whom now that it has been launched, how is it being received here, there and such and such a place; in other words, what are its bureaucratic origins and what are its larger political prospects. The tendency is to concentrate on who did shoot John, who might shoot John, who wants to shoot John but doesn't have a gun.

"I don't think we consciously used [this tendency]," Darman continued, "[but] the President benefited [from it]. The Teflon phenomenon is a function of the fact that when there's a problem with substance, the press doesn't say there's something wrong with Reagan's policies. They say party A in the White House is fighting with party B *about* the policy. It tends to insulate the

President from substantive criticism and convert it into personality stories about conflicts between individuals within the administration beneath the level of the President."

One other related but rarely acknowledged consequence of objective journalism's sourcing habits was to make the press in effect a hostage to the debate within the Washington political elite. Lesley Stahl, who covered the White House for CBS for the first six years of the Reagan presidency, alluded to this dynamic in a February 1987 interview on PBS's *MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour*. Conceding that the press had been slow to pick up on the Iran-contra scandal, Stahl laid part of the blame on the Congress, "which is often a source for these kinds of stories." Indeed, she added, one reason press coverage of Mr. Reagan had not been more aggressive throughout the course of his presidency was that the Congress "ha[d] not been a source for the press in the whole Reagan administration. They don't want to criticize this beloved man."

The press's overwhelming reliance on official sources meant that news coverage of Washington by and large reflected and reinforced the assumptions, opinions and general worldview of official Washington. Venturing beyond the boundaries of the Democrat-to-Republican spectrum was rare in the extreme. However valid a given political position might be on an intellectual level, if it was not forcefully articulated by a significant part of the Washington establishment, it received little or no attention from the mainstream press.

"It's a little harder for the boys in the White House to keep the troops in line than it is for the boys in the Kremlin," investigative reporter Seymour Hersh observed during a May 1987 seminar at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, "but it is true that *Pravda* and *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* are alike in the sense that they don't report reality so much as what a small group of top leaders *tells* them is reality."

Thus did numerous journalists argue that if Ronald Reagan did get off easy, it was less the fault of the press than of the Democratic party. Not only did Democrats fail to project a compelling alternative to Reaganism, they often seemed either afraid or unwilling even to criticize it.

"Look at defense, it's the perfect example," exclaimed David Hoffman of *The Washington Post* in a July 1985 interview. "Ronald Reagan will have doubled the defense budget in five years.

Doubled. That's a lot of dollars every year they didn't have last year. In *The Washington Post* as an editorial voice and even in our headlines and our stories in a certain sense, you see that the debate is now not over whether we should go back to half of what we have now. It's whether we should go back to zero growth. So Reagan has achieved a doubling of the defense budget, and as long as the public supports that [sic] and the public debate is over zero growth or 3 percent growth, that's where our debate is. Now, if next week every Democrat came out and said, 'We're going back to the Carter budget, back to half of what we have now,' we would start writing stories about that. But we're not going to write those until those politicians start to make those noises. We follow in that respect. . . . We fill the paper with stories on the margin of issues, not sweeping overviews. If you went through the paper and stamped every story whether it was 2 degrees, 5 degrees or 360 degrees [off the center of the debate], you would see a lot of 2-degree stories."

Hence the importance of the opposition party to Washington press coverage. The doctrine of objectivity meant that the press was, quite simply, only as adversarial as the opposition party allowed it to be. "I don't think the coverage has been terrible," remarked Jonathan Kwitney, author and investigative reporter for *The Wall Street Journal*. "There has been some good reporting. But there is no opposition within the political system, and that's partly why the stories don't keep running on page one."

Indeed, part of the reason Ronald Reagan was able to pull the political debate so far to the right during his presidency was that there was no countervailing presence on the left in the Washington political arena. In the United States, where anti-Communism had been injected into the collective consciousness so relentlessly for so many years, "soft on Communism" was the last thing any politician—or journalist, for that matter—could afford to have thought about him. Thus criticisms of the nuclear arms race had to be prefaced with declarations of not liking or trusting the Russians any more than the next fellow, and backed up by a voting record that looked favorably on at least some of the big-ticket weapons systems that the Pentagon and its nominally private sector allies ceaselessly put forward as additional necessary deterrence to the Soviet threat. Likewise, if a member of Congress disagreed with President Reagan's policy of making war on Nicaragua, that member invariably first made sure to emphasize that

he detested the Sandinista government as much as Reagan did before voicing any preference for negotiations over bloodshed.

As *New York Times* correspondent R. W. "Johnny" Apple commented: "To come back from Europe [where Apple spent nearly ten years as London bureau chief]—where the parliamentary tradition is alive and the spectrum of acceptable political debate stretches from non-Communist Marxists and Trotskyists and Eurocommunists on the left to neo-fascists on the right—to Washington was striking. I had a broader range of opinion represented around my dinner table in London than you could find in official Washington. . . . My wife and I were sitting around thinking one night of who was the leading left-wing politician in Washington and we came up with Teddy [Kennedy]. Now, Teddy would feel very comfortable in the left wing of the [British] Tory party. He could be quite comfortably accommodated within the Christian Democratic party in West Germany. If he happened to be a socialist, he would be in the far, far right wing of the Socialist party in Spain. That says a lot."

"As a working journalist you have to talk to people and quote them," said Robert Parry. "Normally you go to the opposition party. But what we ran into during that period [of extreme Sandinista bashing from 1983 onward] was that no one would defend the Sandinistas, even to say they weren't the worst things on earth. No one would put them in perspective—by saying that this and this may be true about the Sandinistas, but this and this isn't—because even putting it in perspective was considered defending the Sandinistas. So it was very hard to write stories raising questions about Reagan's policy, because the Democrats weren't playing the role of an opposition party." Parry and his partner at the Associated Press, Brian Barger, responded by visiting Miami, where "the debate going on inside the Nicaraguan exile community was much more honest and broad-based than the debate going on in Washington. We were talking to people who were all anti-Sandinista . . . and they would talk about how artificial the contra movement was and about the corruption [within it]. They were very upset about it. . . . We got a lot more truth out of Miami than we did in Washington."*

* A reporter covering the Middle East could have said the same thing about Jerusalem and Washington. The official debate was considerably broader in Jerusalem than it was in Washington, where, prior to the widespread Palestinian unrest of late 1987, administration and congressional officials alike rarely criticized the actions of the Israeli government.

But reporters like Parry and Barger were the exception. Most Washington journalists focused exclusively on doings in the capital, and thus tended to internalize, if only unconsciously, the basic premises underlying U.S. policy. In foreign policy, for example, the United States was presumed to act from an essentially defensive posture and with benevolent intent; recall, for example, Dean Reynolds's trust that the Reagan administration would not develop a first-strike nuclear weapon. And while the United States was by any historical definition an empire of extraordinary reach and power, with hundreds of overseas military bases and a long record of military and economic interventions aimed at toppling or propping up foreign governments, it was rarely referred to as an empire in mainstream news accounts, nor were its actions evaluated from such a perspective. Likewise, only official U.S. enemies practiced "terrorism"; U.S. allies like El Salvador that engaged in widespread and systematic violence against their civilians were called "democracies" and forgiven their excesses on the grounds that they were resisting "Communist subversion."

Human rights coverage provided perhaps the clearest illustration of the ideological double standard embraced by the U.S. press. While the media showered attention on physicist Andrei Sakharov and other dissidents living in the Soviet sphere of influence, dissidents from the U.S. sphere were usually all but ignored.

Consider, for example, the parallel cases of Lech Walesa and Oscar Romero. Both men suffered abuse at the hands of state authorities for leading struggles of poor and working people for social justice, Walesa as the head of the Solidarity movement in Poland, Romero as a Catholic archbishop in El Salvador. Walesa was repeatedly harassed and imprisoned by the Soviet-backed regime in Poland; Romero was harassed and ultimately assassinated in March 1980 by death squads working for the U.S.-backed regime in El Salvador. Yet while Walesa became a virtual household name in the United States, Archbishop Romero remained a stranger to the American public. In the same manner, the U.S. news media lavished coverage on the Solidarity uprising in December 1981, even as it completely ignored the concurrent terror campaign then underway in Guatemala, where a U.S.-backed military government was engaged in a repression of the civilian population that was substantially more brutal than what was taking place in Poland.

"You're supposed to see El Salvador on one set of terms and Nicaragua on an entirely different set of terms," charges Robert Parry. "I raised this once with Elliott [Abrams] over dinner, and he said, 'I hope you're not going to get into this question of moral equivalency.' . . . [Their] thinking is that when we invade a country, it's okay, but when the Soviets invade a country, it's not." (Repeated attempts to interview Mr. Abrams were rebuffed.) Parry complained that government officials applied a similar double standard to news coverage: "The difference is, if you're writing a story the way they want you to, you could make as many mistakes as you want and not be criticized for it. But if you're writing something that goes against the grain, you had to be perfect. If you had the slightest error, they would latch on to that and use it to come after you."

Journalists who refused to adopt the preferred double standard risked censure not only from U.S. officials but from their colleagues in the press. Parry himself was subjected to a "whisper campaign" in which administration officials, including Elliott Abrams's press secretary, Gregory Lagana, attempted to discredit him as a Sandinista sympathizer to at least two other reporters, according to interviews with those reporters. One Reagan official even tried to convince Parry that his partner, Barger, was politically suspect. "And if you don't succumb to all that," noted Parry, "you get the line from your editors that maybe they should take you off the story, since you seem to be pursuing a political agenda. When the government attacks you, even your colleagues begin to doubt your credibility, when it should be just the opposite."

Compared with the imprisonment and worse risked by journalists elsewhere in the world who dared dissent from official orthodoxy, smearing of reputations and derailing of careers was relatively tame stuff. But in the American context, such tactics generally proved an effective form of coercion. The more a journalist strayed beyond acceptable bounds of discussion, the less likely he was to see his reporting printed or broadcast. As I. F. Stone explained: "There is a palpable range of discourse, and if you stray outside it—either to the right or to the left, but especially to the left—you're not in Siberia or *samizdat*, but you're in *The Nation*, or *In These Times*, or *The Progressive*, and not much read. A young journalist in the mainstream press doesn't have to be told this, he can see it all around him."

"It isn't very easy to try to respect the American tradition of journalistic fairness—'objectivity' is a strange word, I don't know exactly what it means, but 'fairness' is more operative—and it depends on your own perspective," acknowledged CBS News White House correspondent Bill Plante. "You can say it is all pabulum, wire service straight down the middle, report the facts, serve as a conduit for the government, when you should be taking a point of view. I won't argue that it can't be bland, or that we are terribly successful in pointing out the inconsistencies, but I do think the American tradition of journalistic fairness is an important element in allowing freedom of opinion. It may also have helped homogenize thought."

Here Plante expressed the fundamental contradiction inherent in the reigning definition of journalistic fairness: although in theory it was supposed to encourage freedom of opinion, in practice it usually tended to limit the range of political discourse and encourage homogenized political thinking.

Plante's suggested solution to the problem? Teach courses on attribution in the nation's classrooms. Although he resisted the notion that television provided "a point of view that resembles the government's more than anything else," he did admit that "you have to read or listen very carefully to understand what's really being said." Asked to comment on *Boston Globe* political reporter Tom Oliphant's view that the press corps "conveyed Reagan's version of reality" in its 1984 campaign coverage, he replied, "Do you convey Reagan's version of reality, or do you convey what Reagan *says* is reality? We certainly conveyed what he *said* was reality. . . . Now, it may be true that most people don't make that distinction. They should. We ought to start off in grammar school, or junior high, with a course on reading the newspaper and watching television: how to understand attribution."

In the meantime, one alternative was for the press to devote as much time and space to White House critics as it did to the White House itself. The problem was, contradicting the President raised the issue of press neutrality. That did not mean it could never be done, but there were limits; one had to be fair about it. And what was fair? "I have the feeling, and we, meaning the establishment, have the feeling," explained ABC News senior vice president Richard Wald, "that you can say the President is wrong, and you can repeat it once, but after that it becomes a

crusade. And television doesn't do crusades. Nor do newspapers."

This self-imposed restraint was the ideal definition of responsible journalism for the Reagan White House, for Ronald Reagan was nothing if not shameless about repeating statements and stories shown to be false or misleading. Since news organizations tended to consider almost anything a President said or did to be news, and since they were nowhere near as stingy about letting a President make his case as they were about correcting him, simple arithmetic meant that over time the public tended to get far more exposure to the President's than to competing versions of reality.

The political advantages for the White House in this were obvious. Especially during the first six years of his presidency Mr. Reagan time and again shifted the framework of debate simply by repeating the same dubious assertions over and over until they became accepted as political facts of life. On May 9, 1984, for example, Reagan delivered a nationally televised speech about Central America filled with enough accusations of Communist subversion to make one wonder if the White House had hired Joe McCarthy's ghost as a speechwriter. The President charged that "Sandinista rule is a Communist reign of terror" and that Nicaragua was engaged in an unjustified military buildup in order to "export terror to every other country in the region." All this was part of "a bold attempt by the Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua to install Communism by force throughout the hemisphere." While the United States wanted only "to promote democracy and economic well-being" in Central America and would "never be the aggressor," the Communists were shipping tons of weapons to guerrillas in El Salvador who "want to shoot their way into power and establish totalitarian rule." If the United States did not act, quickly and resolutely, "our choice will be a Communist Central America with additional Communist military bases on the mainland of this hemisphere and Communist subversion spreading southward and northward."

Now, it would seem important for Americans to realize that many of the things their President had just told them were at best unproved assertions or one-sided interpretations and at worst demonstrably false statements. Yet not one of the network commentators pointed this out in their post-speech summaries. Nei-

ther did the next day's account in *The New York Times* or *The Washington Post*. To do so would have implied that the President was either a liar or a fool, hardly a politically neutral message. Instead, objectivity prevailed over accuracy, Reagan's statements were reported uncritically, just as Senator McCarthy's were, and the American people were left not merely uninformed but misinformed.

Had news stories given prominent if not equal weight to countervailing views, Reagan would not have been able to impose his often mistaken premises on the political debate so easily. It should have been a simple matter of standing up for truth and accuracy, but in the eyes of objective mainstream journalists such behavior smacked of partisanship and thus violated the sacred vow of neutrality.

James Reston, for example, though he lamented the press's tendency to serve as a "transmission belt" for the official government line of the moment, nonetheless argued that "it would be very dangerous, I think, for us to spend 50 percent of our reports announcing their statements and decisions and then using the other 50 percent to say what liars they are." And even Sam Donaldson, certainly one of the most aggressive reporters in Washington, made a similar point when he cautioned, "My mission is not to blow them out of the water every day. I think it would be very dangerous if I took that attitude."

All of which suggests the conclusion that during the Reagan years the Washington and especially the White House press corps functioned less as an independent than as a palace court press. Journalists were extremely adept at discovering and detailing the intrigues of palace politics—who were the powers behind the throne, what were the King and his men up to, what factions within court society opposed them and how strongly, what decisions were made and what effects they would have. This was valuable information, and often the press reported more of it than some, particularly the King and his men, would have liked. The press in this sense was the bad boy of palace court society. But the press tended to confine its naughtiness within relatively narrow limits. It was not inclined to step outside the mind-set of the authorities it covered, or to challenge in any fundamental way the policies they formulated or the assumptions and values that gave rise to those policies. As Robert Kaiser explained, journalists

and news organizations "are members of this class, this governing political class." As such, their coverage inevitably reflected the values, beliefs and interests of that class. Although formally independent, in practice the American press functioned more often than not as an arm of the American state.

WITLESS MALEVOLENCE

THE Reagan years seem destined to be regarded as one of the most fantastic eras in American history, a time when the national political debate was dominated by a bundle of ideas that almost without exception were contradicted by objective facts, common sense or both. In economic policy, there was the President's confident assertion that the government could slash taxes and escalate military spending without bloating the deficit, and that it could cut social spending without ravaging the poor. In foreign policy, there was the notion that Nicaragua, a country of some three million impoverished peasants, posed a sufficiently grave threat to U.S. national security to justify the waging of an illegal war that made a mockery of America's claim to global moral leadership. Similarly shallow-brained views prevailed across the entire spectrum of public policy, from civil rights and the environment to nuclear weapons, drugs and terrorism.

The American news media remained remarkably blasé in the face of the seemingly endless stream of irrational or otherwise baseless claims flowing from Washington. Upon Reagan's ascension to power in 1981, the press quickly settled into a posture of accommodating passivity from which it never completely arose. Relieved by the departure of Jimmy Carter, gulled by false claims of a right-wing popular mandate, impressed by Reagan's recovery after being shot and seduced by his sunny personality and his propaganda apparatus's talent for providing prepackaged stories boasting attractive visuals, the Washington press corps favored the newly elected President with coverage that even his own advisers considered extremely positive. Few in the press remarked on how biased Reagan's 1981 tax and budget cuts were in favor of the rich over the poor, for example. And not a soul noticed that, thanks to a bookkeeping trick eventually disclosed by David

Stockman, the Pentagon managed to increase its budget by some \$80 billion *per year* above what even Reagan and his peace-through-strength 1980 campaign advisers had advocated.

Criticism did begin to be heard as the economy shuddered to a halt late in 1981 amid growing evidence that Reagan was, as journalists so gently phrased it, "disengaged" from the realities of governance, and things were touch and go for much of 1982. The bad economic news kept coming, and the press sometimes blamed the President. But once the first feeble signs of recovery appeared in the spring of 1983, the danger passed. So-called Reagan gaffe stories mysteriously disappeared. News reports began speculating that Mr. Reagan would be a hard man to beat come next year's elections.

The August 1983 Korean airliner tragedy was exploited to heighten the anti-Communist hysteria that had already done so much to preclude criticism of Reagan's foreign and military policies. Conquering Grenada ratcheted the mood of self-congratulatory nationalism up yet another notch while distracting attention from the 241 marines killed in the Beirut bombing days earlier. Despite the censorship imposed by the administration, the press played the Caribbean invasion as the President's "finest hour" and held no lasting grudge. As James Baker later recalled: "We had a difference of opinion with the press with respect to Grenada, of course, but it didn't carry over into generally negative reporting."

It certainly did not. When the economy kept expanding in 1984, the press saw little reason to resist Michael Deaver's attempt to portray Reagan's re-election as inevitable; campaign coverage obligingly conveyed the White House version of reality. While Walter Mondale was ridiculed as a wimp beholden to special interests, Ronald Reagan was saluted as a great patriot who made Americans proud of their country again. Thus did news organizations in the world's greatest democracy fulfill their self-proclaimed ideal of objective journalism in the fateful year of 1984.

"You ain't seen nothing yet," Mr. Reagan crowed as he began his second term. And it was true—not just of him but of the press, whose exaltations of the President as a leader of unique gifts and moral standing now reached a fever pitch. Reagan's April 1985 visit to a West German cemetery containing the graves of Nazi

SS members, which occasioned the one spasm of hard-edged coverage he encountered in the second term prior to Iran-contra, provoked no tempering of this judgment. Nor did his cheerful disregard for the millions of hungry and homeless people haunting the nation's streets. Nor did the steadily growing list of top administration officials accused of illegal or unethical conduct. Even as he championed the values of individualism and material gain that gave rise to these developments, Ronald Reagan was treated as somehow separate and apart from them.

And then came the Iran-contra affair. David Gergen, who believed the early Reagan years had witnessed a return to the traditional deference that the press had exhibited toward the government in the days before Watergate and Vietnam, expressed the fear early in the scandal that Iran-contra marked the end of deference. At the time, it seemed a plausible conjecture. But as the scandal played itself out over the ensuing months, it became increasingly clear that this climactic episode in the relationship between the Reagan White House and the American press constituted less a departure from the patterns of the past six years than a reaffirmation of them.

After all, it took wrongdoing on the scale of Watergate—wrongdoing judged as such by some 90 percent of the American people and, crucially, by Reagan's own right-wing allies in Washington—along with the Democrats' regaining control of both houses of Congress, before the nation's major news organizations subjected Reagan to the kind of sustained and aggressive coverage that should be the norm in a properly functioning democratic system of checks and balances. And even then, the press delivered a less than stellar performance. It was astonishingly late coming to the Iran-contra story, easily diverted from the fundamental issues and all too willing to give up the chase.

Still, it would be foolish to blame the press alone for the extraordinary political successes of the Reagan administration, or to hold it solely accountable for the shameful deterioration in the honesty and vitality of the nation's political life that took place during the Reagan years. Surely the President himself should also be held responsible for what happened, as should Michael Deaver, James Baker, David Gergen, Richard Darman, Larry Speakes, Richard Wirthlin and all the others who labored so intensively in his service. Together they sold the official myths of

Reagan's presidency to the American public by developing a sophisticated new model for manipulating the press. Many of the techniques they applied—such as the virtual elimination of regular press conferences and the stage-managed emotional appeals designed to distract attention from Reagan's actual policies—bespoke a fear of open government and accountable democracy, not to mention contempt for people's intelligence. Others, such as packaging and promoting the President as if he were a new brand of automobile, debased the nation's political process in subtler though no less dangerous ways.

Faced with the challenge of implementing policies which, as Gergen conceded after the fact, were directly at odds with mass sentiment, Reagan's men made the presentation of issues, rather than their substance, the pre-eminent consideration. This strategy meshed perfectly with the sort of television-dominated, bottom-line-oriented journalism increasingly being practiced by the major national news organizations in the 1980s. And these organizations responded in kind with gentle, jelly-bean journalism that elevated surface over substance and obfuscated the real issues at stake; it was a perfect symbiosis.

The animating mentality of the Reagan propaganda apparatus was revealed in all its witless malevolence by Michael Deaver's cheerful confession that he didn't know or care whether SDI would actually work; speaking of the weapons system that might someday end life on the planet, he said he supported it because it was "a great concept." Yet the Reagan model and the value system it embodies now threaten to become a permanent feature of American politics. For that alone, the men of the Reagan apparatus deserve censure of the highest order.

But they never could have achieved so much had the rest of official Washington not acquiesced, in word and deed, to so much of their agenda. Cowed by exaggerated impressions of Reagan's popularity, Congress, and the Democrats in particular, repeatedly shrank back from challenging Reagan's basic assumptions and directions. Indeed, throughout the Reagan era, the Democrats were a pathetic excuse for an opposition party—timid, divided, utterly lacking in passion, principle and vision, a paler version of Reaganism but without the Reagan.

Nor can the American people escape all responsibility for what was done in their name during the Reagan years. True, they were

frequently deprived of plain-spoken explanations of what was going on around them. But what I. F. Stone once said about the bureaucracy in Washington applies equally well to the U.S. news media: it puts out so much information every day that it can't help but let the truth slip from time to time. To anyone paying the minimum amount of attention required of a concerned citizen, the basic thrust of Reagan's policies was clear. And there were plenty of opportunities for resisting them. For all the power wielded by preservers of the status quo, citizens of the United States had more freedom to challenge government policy than did citizens anywhere else in the world.

To be sure, they were hardly encouraged in this direction by the press (or by most mainstream political leaders, for that matter). Indeed, the political effect of most news coverage was to fill people's heads with officially sanctioned truth and thus to encourage among them a sense of isolation, confusion and apathy bordering on despair. This was to be expected; after all, the press took its definition of what constituted political news from the political governing class in Washington. Thus while the press *shaped* mass opinion, it *reflected* elite opinion; indeed, it effectively functioned as a mechanism by which the latter was transformed, albeit imperfectly, into the former.

It is tempting to dismiss the Reagan years as aberrational, a time when a feverish madness temporarily overtook the country, causing otherwise sensible people in the press and elsewhere to forsake reason, lose the courage of their convictions and drift into smug self-delusion. Alas, all this did happen. But this explanation mistakes symptoms for causes. Most of the salient characteristics of the relationship between the press and the White House predated the Reagan years; the excesses of those years simply made their existence, and their consequences, much more apparent.

The fundamental problem was that the press was part of, and beholden to, the structure of power and privilege in the United States. That did not mean it never challenged a President. The corporate counteroffensive of the 1970s, for example, was eventually reflected in press coverage sharply critical of President Carter. And even Ronald Reagan, a rich man's President if there ever was one, was attacked in the aftermath of the October 1987 stock-market crash. (In a display of breathtaking hypocrisy after the Wall Street debacle, *Time* ridiculed the President it had so

vigorously applauded throughout his first term as "befuddled," "dodder[ing]" and "embarrassingly irrelevant," and went on to declare that he had "stayed a term too long.") But for the most part, Reagan was spared from genuinely adversarial coverage. As a member of Washington palace court society and a creature of the establishment, the press simply was constitutionally disinclined to offer fundamental criticisms of a presidency that above all else articulated and advanced the interests of corporate America. Journalists allowed loyalty to their executive superiors and official sources to take precedence over their obligations to the public and the country.

One need only consider the 1988 presidential campaign to see what lessons the press, and the politicians, have drawn from the Reagan experience. Both George Bush and Michael Dukakis have run campaigns modeled on the 1984 Reagan effort: control one's message by staging photo-opportunity events that boast all the spontaneity of May Day parades in Moscow; keep reporters at a distance; and avoid being drawn into meaningful give-and-take about one's record or future plans. Meanwhile, the nation's journalists are once again gripped by horse-race mania. Once again, citizens are told far more about where the candidates stand in the polls than where they stand on the issues. Once again, ratings prevail over responsibility, news is treated as a commodity to be sold rather than an educational trust to be fulfilled and fundamental questions about the nation's direction are neglected in favor of the six-second sound bite.

When Abe Rosenthal said that for a paper like *The New York Times* there are no excuses, there are only values, he could just as easily have been speaking of any of the major newspapers, television networks, magazines and other large news organizations that in their seamless totality exercise such enormous influence over the national political discussion in late-twentieth-century America. The news media have become the single most influential actor on the stage of American politics. Their power is only increasing, and there exist precious few checks and balances upon them.

The press's failure during the Reagan years suggests that the time has come for a fresh debate on its role within American society. For no matter who is elected President in 1988, the quality of press coverage and therefore of the nation's political debate

and its democratic process promises only to get worse unless the men and women of the press return to first principles and live up to the concept of a free and independent press first upheld some two hundred years ago by the American Revolution. Perhaps this is too much to expect from employees of the profit-obsessed corporations that now own America's news organizations. But in a land that once produced the likes of Adams, Paine and Jefferson, that is a bitter thought indeed.

the press must be revised upward. If his presidency is to be branded as mediocre—if his administration got a much better press than it deserved—then he must be acknowledged as the greatest manipulator of the media since FDR and an even greater communicator than Ronald Reagan. One thing is certain: Whatever his motive, his distinction as the first president to admit the public via television to the White House press conference is secure. He did open “a new era in political communication.”

NOTES

1. 312 reporters jammed the Indian Treaty Room of the old Executive Office Building on Feb. 29, 1956, to hear President Eisenhower announce whether he would run for a second term.
2. Kennedy did, in fact, bobble a foreign policy question at his first conference. He said he looked forward to a resumption of atomic “tests” when he meant atomic “talks.” There were no repercussions.
3. FDR used the “fireside” format sparingly, making only four such talks during his first year and only eight during his first term as President.
4. With 64 news conferences in 34 months, for an average of 1.882 conferences per month, JFK finally finished behind Ike, who held 193 in 96 months for an average of 2.01 per month. Both finished far behind FDR (998 in 12 years and 3 months, 6.789 per month) and Truman (324 in 7 years and 9 months, 3.483 per month.)
5. He was a reporter briefly for Hearst’s International News Service following World War II and a voracious reader of newspapers and periodicals.
6. *Fortune* magazine, March, 1963.

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Ronald Reagan

HELEN THOMAS

MR. THOMPSON: I want to read a bit from someone who very early in the Reagan administration wrote the following column:

President Reagan has managed to keep his domestic program of massive federal spending cuts on center stage but in the foreign policy field he still is feeling his way. The policy so far has been marked by ambiguities and contradictions with no apparent overall direction. The current line vis-à-vis the Soviets appears to be the hallmark but even that seems vulnerable to other pragmatic requirements.

That piece written by Helen Thomas stands up rather well.

Helen Thomas was born in Kentucky; attended Wayne University; has honorary degrees from a number of institutions; served as wire service reporter in Washington beginning in 1943; White House bureau chief, 1974 to the present; was president of the White House Correspondents Association, 1975-76, the first woman president; was the recipient of the Woman of the Year in Communications Award by the *Ladies Home Journal*; was the first woman elected to the Gridiron Club of Washington; has been a member of the Women’s National Press Corps and its president; has been a member of Sigma Delta Chi’s Hall of Fame; Delta Sigma Pi’s honorary membership; is the author of *Dateline: White House* and, finally, is one of the most respected figures in the American field of journalism. It’s a privilege to welcome you to Virginia.

MS. THOMAS: I’m honored to be here at the University founded by a great defender of freedom of the press, Thomas Jefferson, though

he may have wondered himself at times what hath God wrought. I'm particularly proud to be on the same platform with two great reporters who know so well the byzantine manipulation of information at the White House through the years. For as all presidents learn, information equals power. Press relations with any president always run a predictable course—downhill. And it may be ever thus as long as we are the watchmen at the tower.

I've always considered myself greatly privileged to cover the White House. Each day is an education and of course we have the proverbial ringside to history, instant history. It's true, of course, inasmuch as some may think otherwise, we are mindful that human beings live in the White House with their joys, their sorrows, their insecurities, their arrogance and their rare nobility. The obvious inevitable prognosis for relations between any president and the press seems to go from bad to worse, though not in the beginning when every president is accorded a honeymoon. That was best typified when the *Washington Post* cartoonist, Herblock, gave Nixon a clean shave after he assumed office. Many years earlier dating back to the McCarthy era, he drew Nixon in the most sinister terms. In the full flush of an inauguration presidents are twelve feet tall and all is right with the world. The press, too, is caught up in this uncritical moment that goes along with learning that, in those first euphoric days of Gerald Ford's accession, Ford toasted his own English muffins. Then there is the mood, perhaps in the press as well as the country, to give him a chance as his style and his actions come into focus.

Ronald Reagan had a longer honeymoon than most presidents. The attempt on his life coming so soon after he had moved into the White House produced an understandable brief moratorium and bought him some time, even as his aides spoke of a "safety net for the poor" as social programs were being slashed. As time went on, the press was accused of not laying a glove on Reagan and some of their peers like Anthony Lewis wrote that reporters were being too soft on the President and were giving him a free ride. Since we see ourselves as factual reporters, I don't think a day has passed that we have not faithfully reported Reagan's moves to dismantle the programs from the New Deal to the Great Society, or at least to curb them radically. From that aspect Reagan has been true to his philosophy. He is a rigid ideologue and only rarely does he beat a strategic retreat.

In the early days of the Reagan administration the promise was, as it is with every president, an open administration. I can only say—that will be the day, not only for this administration, but all the others we've covered. Press access to Reagan during his 1980 campaign was extremely limited, more a case of hit-and-run with aides closing in before a reporter could toss a follow-up question. The *modus operandi* continued at the White House. Then reporters were treated to an affable, genial, nice president—very friendly, seemingly willing to answer any question during brief so-called photo opportunities in the Oval Office. His top aides, Edwin Meese, James Baker, Michael Deaver, all neophytes to the national government—except Baker whose own experience was limited—became apopleptic when Reagan would deliver an off-the-cuff answer. Reagan himself could not resist an answer. But it appeared that his aides protectively and perhaps with some smug superiority on their part felt that he should not be questioned, that they were really smarter than he was and that some of his answers were not programmed or screened enough.

Since the picture takings were the only point of access to Reagan, reporters tried to make the most of it. I recall one day when Reagan was meeting with a head of state, the "thundering herd," which is what we're called, rushed into the Oval Office. The time was ten forty-five a.m., fifteen minutes before the eleven o'clock deadline that Reagan had set for firing the air traffic controllers. It was an opportunity not to be passed up. I asked Reagan while picture-taking was going on if he was indeed going ahead with his plan to fire the controllers. He said he was and we ran to our electronic computers, not the telephone as often any more. Within hours his top aides decided that they had had it with impromptu questions to the press and they laid down the law that Reagan was not to be questioned when he was with a foreign leader for decorum's sake. We agreed to nothing and never do, but we did not push our luck with heads of state. Then, heady with a bit of success in putting us in our place, the Reaganites decided that all questions to the President during such sessions should be verboten. We defy those rules all the time but in their frustration they devised a system whereby once a week Reagan would answer questions in a quicky ten minute encounter on their own terms and whenever they decide.

Access to Reagan is very limited and under the most controlled

circumstances. He's had nine news conferences so far, a far cry from FDR and some of his predecessors. FDR held two a week even in wartime. Being human, presidents do not relish the idea of meeting the press, particularly when there's nothing to brag about. When Jim Brady was on deck, he managed to keep the atmosphere light and to deflect hostility. It no longer is the Gulag that we once knew in the Nixon era. His deputy, Larry Speakes, who presides at news briefings came up through a tough school. He had worked in the White House in the Nixon era as spokesman for Nixon's chief Watergate lawyer. Speakes, White House Communications Director David Gergen, and the big three advisors huddle every day to decide what story they will feature, what story will land Reagan on the front page in the best light, of course. They decide what activity of the day involving the President we can cover. Days can go by when we do not see him, even when he has a full official schedule on the record. The term "managed news" coined in the Kennedy era has been developed to a fine art. Reagan's aides even have trained him to say, "I can't comment, it's a photo opportunity." It's all on their terms and they calculate what will do them the most good, imagewise.

And yet one wonders at times, because sometimes it gets away from them. For example, last Friday when the highest unemployment rate since the Great Depression was announced, Reagan, toggled out in his lovely riding britches, came out on the South Lawn, denounced the Democrats for demagoguery and went off like the playboy of the western world on a helicopter to go riding in the Virginia countryside. And then he was very stubborn imagewise when his aides told him that the economy was so bad and the picture was so bad that he really shouldn't take a vacation in Barbados and stay at the home of Claudette Colbert seeming to be wallowing in the rich atmosphere that he's often identified with. He insisted that he was going, so they immediately started putting on some official meetings, had him stop overnight in Jamaica where he could be treated as a head of state and have official talks on the Caribbean. Then, when he went to Barbados, they did have a meeting with some of the smaller Caribbean nation leaders. Then for three days he had his vacation. Well, the AP, unfortunately not us, did the story saying that it cost the taxpayers 3.5 million dollars for Reagan to have his vacation in the Barbados, which he insisted on doing even though his aides had told him, imagewise,

it's not so good. Then he made a speech, one of his regular Saturday radio speeches and he started out by saying, "Well, I took the day off on Good Friday like everyone takes off and I'm going to church on Sunday," and it was so defensive. But he did have his vacation. It isn't "Let them eat cake," but I think that he calls his own shots even though they try to manage and program him.

In recent months Reagan has lost some of his initial affability with the press. But not all. He has fallen into the presidential syndrome of displaying anger over leaks from time to time. Washington is one giant ear, he has complained. He also says he is convinced there are bugs in the chandelier in the cabinet room. Many of the reforms that grew out of the nightmare that was Watergate have been eliminated or will be if Reagan has his way. The drive has been systematic to cut down legitimate access to news in the foreign policy field. New regulations have been devised to tighten the circle of those with access to top secret documents. The Freedom of Information Act is under siege, and Reagan's forces seek to legitimize domestic spying by the CIA.

Worse yet is the atmosphere of darkness at noon with lie detectors being used to nail the leakers. When a colonel was accused of leaking the report that experts believed that defense spending would rise dramatically to a trillion dollars, he was informed that he would probably lose his job, although it's still under investigation. "We want to make an example of him," said one Pentagon spokesman. *Deja vu*. No plumbers on the scene so far as we can tell. But the atmosphere is conducive. There is little or no room for devil's advocates in this administration and it's doubtful that Reagan gets a variety of opinion except for the bickering that was often exposed between then Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. The people are not in on the take-offs, only the landings.

I remember when they started the whole focus on El Salvador. Ed Meese appeared on "Issues and Answers." It was February, one month after Reagan had taken office and we were practically drawing a line in El Salvador. People didn't know what was going to happen next. And Meese went on the air and under questioning said, "We will do whatever is necessary in El Salvador." And we heard this program had been taped so he got on Air Force One with us coming back from Santa Barbara to Washington; he came back to the press area and we said, "What do you mean, whatever

dollar civil defense program, it was released by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, put out on a quiet wire without any fanfare with only alert reporters finally catching up. One has to ask why. Surely a program affecting the safety of every American should have been announced at the White House. But perhaps the White House wanted no close identity with a program that informs Americans that they've got eight days to get out of town in the event of a nuclear war.

I know that in the eyes of some the role of the press is dubious. We are self-appointed watchdogs, annoyed by none, feared by some, and guided, we hope, by one main ethical goal: to pursue the truth wherever it leads. If government servants are watched, well, we are, too. We reporters get a report card every day. Every day we are tested for our accuracy and our profound responsibility to the American people. And I must say that there would be no covering of the White House if the White House didn't have a lot of rope. People will never know how physical is such a job and how demeaning in many ways because we never cover a president except when they put a rope around us. We're corralled like cattle. The Secret Service now has taken over our lives in the protection of the president, whether valid or not. More and more they've discovered helicopters—he rarely travels in public, his access to people has become almost nonexistent except on occasion when everything is very sanitized.

But the whole question is that reporters are some sort of a necessity yet this is the way we are treated. Our credibility is also at stake and is much more quickly exposed for all to see in any newspapers, on any television. A Supreme Court Justice once said that a constant spotlight on public officials lessens the possibility of corruption. And in the words of Justice Brandeis, if the government becomes a law breaker, it breeds contempt for the law. The importance of a free and robust press cannot be underestimated, but that we are a thorn in the side of government officials and others in public life is obvious. We know it's not our role to be loved or even liked—respected, we hope, and even by presidents, for being fair.

Each president has had his troubles with the press, going back to George Washington. We have a photograph of FDR in our press room which is inscribed to the White House reporters from their "devoted victim." "When the press stops abusing me, I'll know I'm

in the wrong pew," said Truman. "Reading more and enjoying it less," said Kennedy. What LBJ said is unprintable. Nixon had his enemy's list and, once when the press walked into the cabinet room for picture taking, Nixon looked up at the press and said, "It's only coincidental that we're talking about pollution when the press walks in." Carter always seemed to be saying, "Lord, forgive them, for they know not what they do." As for Reagan, well, it's like being in those silent movies. He thinks we should be seen and not heard.

But I thought that Amy Carter kind of summed up the attitude when her mother escorted her to a public school, first day in class after they moved into the White House. Reporters and cameramen had been alerted in Washington that they could record this historic moment and promise never to bother little Amy again. And so the reporters and photographers flanked the walk to the school door. Amy looked at the press, her hand was held by her mother and she looked up at her mother and said, "Mom, do we still have to be nice to them?"

And I'll go with Jeff Carter, the former President's youngest son during the first Christmas in Plains, Georgia. We were standing across the street from the family home keeping an eye on Carter who had come out on the porch, playing with his grandchildren, grandstanding, we thought, on the porch for our benefit. A television cameraman asked Jeff, who strolled across the street, if he didn't feel sorry for his father hounded by the press, clocking his every move, and Jeff said, "No, he asked for it." And I guess that's the way I feel about presidents. They ask for it, knowing the press tries to be ever vigilant, ever present to keep an eye on the person who has life and death, pushbutton power over all humanity today, to keep the people informed and democracy alive. Thank you.

MR. THOMPSON: Do you think it's numbers that threaten presidents? If there were not as many reporters following them, if there were three of you, say, or ten more, would some of these historic attitudes of aversion toward the press be as deep-seated?

MS. THOMAS: You mean in terms of how we're treated?

MR. THOMPSON: Well, yes, and in terms of the negative attitudes toward the press.

MS. THOMAS: In terms of the public or the White House?

MR. THOMPSON: Well, in the early press conference days people talked about the fact that Roosevelt could fit the reporters into the Oval Office. Now if a graduate student at American University has made a contribution to President Carter's campaign he can get into a press conference.

MS. THOMAS: I don't think there's any question that the magnitude of the press corps now magnifies the problem. But I maintain that sometimes when we're only a pool of three or four reporters the Secret Service still continues to push us around because it's become a built-in syndrome. You cannot believe that if you're wearing a pass, if you have been cleared by the Secret Service, that you shouldn't even be in the White House if you're any kind of threat, and yet they continue to draw a line on every step you take.

MR. LATIMER: Did that then accentuate during the Reagan administration or was it just as bad under Carter and the others?

MS. THOMAS: It gave the Secret Service a chance for a quantum leap. They would just as soon keep him in a little capsule and. . .

MR. DEAKIN: What you're saying is that this jump started after the assassination attempt?

MR. LATIMER: That's what I was wondering.

MS. THOMAS: It's all relative.

MR. CORMIER: It was not to this degree by any means, not at all.

MR. LATIMER: Does this seem to be the personal decision by Reagan himself? I mean, if left to his own devices would he do all this?

MS. THOMAS: Oh no, no. He's a friendly, nice man. There is no question about it. He likes people; I think he perhaps is not as affable as sometimes he appears but he certainly is a good politician. He knows people are important to a politician. But of course the press is in the role that you can't defy security because, indeed, they may be right or maybe they know something you don't know. But I am saying that people will never understand what it takes to get information. One day I was on a helicopter six times just covering the President to make sure that while he is in public nothing happens. I know it's macabre but that's the way it goes.

MR. CORMIER: It goes to ridiculous lengths. This is almost off the point but I can't forget it. Paul Healy borrowed a book from Nelson Rockefeller when he was vice president and the security in the old Executive Office Building in Washington, at least prior to Reagan, was much more stringent than at the White House. And so Paul had an appointment to see Rockefeller to return this book. The police stopped him, wanted to know what he was doing and he explained, and they made a call to Rockefeller's office: yes, he had the appointment; and the police said, "You can go in but the book stays here." It becomes pretty damn oppressive.

MS. THOMAS: At the same time the press offices also do not want us to comment—well, in terms of image this is a very interesting thing. You're always challenged on your own scepticism. Are you being fair? Every reporter does the same soulsearching every day. I've seen the Reagan administration make many end runs around civil rights laws, trying to cut them down and so forth. There's no question about it. Then the President picked up the newspaper, as they tell it later, and reads about this one family in College Park, Maryland right outside of Washington that had been harrassed; they've had a cross burning five years ago, crank telephone calls and garbage dumped on their lawn. He is struck by this horror and he comes in waving his newspaper in the Oval Office and he asks his aide, "What can we do about this? This is terrible, I'd like to go see them."

So the aide proceeds to put everything in place, get in touch with the family's lawyer and so forth and six hours later Larry Speakes comes running out. We have fifteen minutes to get on a helicopter because the President's going to go visit this family. He says the President did not want to take any press with him. He just wants to go tell this family how sorry he is, but we have talked him into having the press there—with the four thirty and the six o'clock news, you've got an hour and a half to make good—but we insisted, we told him that he had to. So anyway the President gets on the helicopter on the South Lawn and we go practically to the Washington Monument to get on another helicopter, fly to another spot, motorcade through the rush hour to get to this family. The President and Mrs. Reagan go into this home to talk to the family. The family had been alerted, the little girl was in her Sunday best and so forth. Every neighbor—I mean, at least 150 neighbors who were supposed to be maltreating these people and I'm sure they had

been—were there, every television station had sent a cameraman and reporter. It's a good local story as well as for us, it was very good. But three or four times we were told the President absolutely did not want any press but that they had convinced him that it was necessary because he would be in public. He spends about 20 minutes inside the house, then comes out and a reporter asks a question. He is from here to the wall and one of his aides said "No further, this is the line." This is Andersonville. They drew the line. We were part of a pool, we had traveled with him and so forth. So you still find yourself almost shouting and he obviously wants to talk.

Then I think: am I so cynical that I think that maybe they wanted the press? They are embarked on an image change in terms of blacks, women, whatever and yet, I said, maybe he legitimately did not want the press, so you are confused as to where the truth is. Anyway, my feelings did not get into my story. I wrote it as factually as possible, pulling out all the stops on how the neighbors felt and so forth. Reporters do their own soul searching and I'm a cynic with hope.

Well, they did make the evening news, indeed they did in a very positive way.

MR. DEAKIN: Can I make a comment on the subject of bigness? What you're really asking, I gather, is: Are the American people offended and do they grow irritated and suspicious when they see this tremendous quantity of coverage, the number of people surrounding the president? You've got television people and cameras, and the president and the press are all jockeying for position and so forth. In a way you dealt with this in your commission report—the shouting, the waving hands and so forth.

Two points: In 1937, when Leo Rosten wrote his book on the Washington press corps, he found that there were six hundred accredited correspondents in Washington. He did this simply by counting up the number of reporters and photographers who were accredited to the Congressional press galleries. Today the figure is at least 4,300. So the press corps between 1937 and 1982 grew at least sevenfold, from 600 to 4,300, and probably more. And somehow people have the idea there's something wrong about this. Some of them are simply offended by the undignified spectacle of all these reporters and minicams and photographers trailing after

the president and shouting and jostling for position. And with some, I think, even if they don't articulate it, there's a feeling of "This is too big." It's always that way, of course—power and bigness alarm people and frighten people.

But there's a double standard at work here with respect to the press. I don't want to get paranoid. I've seen too many paranoid politicians. But nevertheless a double standard is being applied to the press, because elsewhere in the American society bigness is considered very, very good. It's considered a desirable thing. We used to have literally scores of automobile companies; now we have three. The entire trend of the American economy has been toward bigness. Bigness works and smallness is inefficient. Well, when the same thing happens with the news media, which are themselves big business, free enterprise—somehow something is wrong with it.

Now, I'm going to give you a little comment, if I may, on something that Helen said at the beginning of her very admirable presentation. She made a reference to the famous Herblock cartoon in early 1969, after Nixon had been inaugurated. Herblock, as Helen points out, had always pictured Nixon with a villainous five o'clock shadow. But now he drew a cartoon showing himself as a barber and offering Nixon a free shave, in other words, a fresh start. OK, the reporters remembered the McCarthy era, we remembered Jerry Voorhis, we remembered Helen Gahagan Douglas, we remembered the '62 gubernatorial election in California where they set up this phony Democrats-for-Nixon committee, using people's names without their permission or without even notifying them. Pat Brown took them to court, it was so flagrant. So we remembered all the demagoguery and all the dirty tricks, because the dirty tricks were operating even that early. There was nothing new about Watergate. As Victor Lasky said, it had happened before. Yes, it had happened before—under Nixon.

All right. We remembered all that, but what Herblock was doing was symbolizing the attitude that prevailed in the press corps. Nixon was now President of the United States, and as Lyndon Johnson said we only have one president at a time. If he succeeds, we succeed. If he fails, we fail. So there was going to be a honeymoon. The press was offering this man a honeymoon. That's what the Herblock cartoon symbolized. They were offering a fresh start in their relationship with him.

Now I want to give you Nixon's reaction, because it is not generally known what his reaction was. Jim Keogh, who was his speechwriter, attended Nixon's first cabinet meeting before the Inauguration. It took place on December 12, 1968. Nixon had been supported by 80 percent of America's newspapers, so the honeymoon spirit was in the air, and here was Nixon's reaction, as reported by Keogh:

Always remember that the men and women of the news media approach this as an adversary relationship. The time will come when they will run lies about you. And the columnists and editorial writers will make you seem to be scoundrels or fools or both. And the cartoonists will depict you as ogres. Some of your wives will get up in the morning and look at the papers and start to cry. Now, don't let this get you down, don't let it defeat you and don't try to adjust your actions to what you think will please them. Do what you think is the right thing to do and let the criticism roll off your back. Don't think that the criticism you see or hear in one or two places is all that is getting through to the public.

It's that first sentence I want to draw to your attention. "Always remember the men and the women of the news media approach this as an adversary relationship." In other words, it didn't make any difference whether the press was offering this man a honeymoon or not. As far as he was concerned, there could not be a honeymoon. He wasn't going to have a honeymoon because he was absolutely convinced that the press was implacably opposed to him.

MS. THOMAS: And he had felt that way since 1940.

MR. DEAKIN: He had felt that way ever since he had discovered that the *Los Angeles Times* was not the only newspaper in America. As long as all he had to read was the *Los Angeles Times*, which was coddling him and giving no space to his opponents and playing him up as the great, young anti-Communist Congressman and so forth, he thought that's all the press was. Then all of a sudden he discovered there were other papers besides the *Times*.

MS. THOMAS: I think that the public reaction is understandable. They see us shouting at the president, in terms of the quicky

so-called ten minute press conferences. It's very competitive, we're each shouting to get a question in, and the TV people are even more competitive because they have their cameras there and they have to make good for their bosses as well as imagewise. It's a real scramble, and ten minutes is certainly not enough to develop anything before Speakes panics and cuts it off. This is what they consider a feeding, and knowing that this would come across like a bunch of banshees to the public. We all get mail: How can you treat the president like this, you horrible person, and so forth. They'll never understand.

Also I think I resent quite a bit the columnists who do sit in their ivory towers after we scramble for one word from a president and I mean one. They can sit back and say: the president said this today. One day the president was walking out of the White House and I said, "Mr. President, is there a recession on?" As he stepped into his helicopter he said, "Yes." This is the kind of thing. Weeks could go by when you wouldn't have a press conference to ever ask him that. But you are there, you're there in the middle of the night, you're there at five o'clock in the morning or whatever time it's necessary to get one assessment.

MR. DEAKIN: I've got to tell you a story about Lyndon Johnson to add to that list. Helen is one of these reporters who lives for the honest answer that you occasionally get. During the Dominican crisis—you remember this, Helen—this was when twenty-five hundred people allegedly had their heads chopped off, the whole business. During the Dominican crisis, Johnson had this incredible walking press conference when he talked about our people being killed and the U.S. Ambassador telephoning from under his desk while the bullets were whistling by. And all of this was just absolutely untrue. Furthermore, two weeks had gone by and there had been plenty of time to check and Johnson was still giving out wrong information and declassifying secret reports from the CIA on the spot. That didn't seem to work. Sending the Marines to the Dominican Republic wasn't selling. So he came up with a new justification for it, and it was the standard justification—the Commies are behind it. The Dominican revolution is about to go Communist.

MS. THOMAS: First explanation for it was to protect the Americans.

MR. DEAKIN: Yes, first it was to protect the Americans. That didn't work. So then he switched to the Commie threat in the Dominican

Republic. He started saying the revolt had been taken over by the Communists. He doled out that line, the national security line. And then he held another walking press conference. John Chancellor was covering for NBC at that time, and John, not anticipating the kind of answer he was going to get, said, "Mr. President, at what point did you discover that the Dominican revolution was being taken over by the Communists?" He stopped and said, "At no time." It was the only time he told the truth in the whole crisis.

MR. CORMIER: I'd like to raise a point. I think that a lot of what Helen has been talking about is the necessity for the press to corner the president wherever they can, sometimes in a fashion that is a little unseemly, maybe. This really points back to a fundamental failure by Reagan to implement as promised the recommendations of the Miller Center Commission on presidential press conferences with respect to the frequency of holding these conferences.

If the man were available, as the Commission suggested and as he should be, this all would become quite unnecessary.

MR. DEAKIN: They may be sitting down for the press conference, Ken, in response to your report. But the other thing you called for was frequency of press conferences.

MR. JONES: In those statements the two characterizations that comes through to me most—both fascinating statements and descriptions of the relationship—are skepticism and cynicism, above all. Are these characteristics essential for doing a good job?

MR. DEAKIN: Yes on number one. If a reporter isn't skeptical of official statements, he is not a reporter. If a reporter is not skeptical of what not just the government but everyone tells him, what is the impetus for him to go on and try to find out what the truth is? If he just accepts it—oh, you say that black is white, all right I'll put it in my paper that black is white—what kind of reporting is that? Is that journalism? Is that communication, maintaining a conduit of information? Skepticism is absolutely vital.

Now cynicism depends. I spent twenty-five years covering the White House, and after it reached a certain point I had to guard against paralytic cynicism. Because I had seen so much human folly, so many mistakes, so many lies, that I had to pull myself up short all the time and say: yes, I understand. They are human

beings, they are under pressure, they are lying because they wish to prevail, they want their policies and programs to prevail. I must understand why they are lying. I must not permit myself to become paralytically cynical, to the point that I cannot ever see a good motive or worthwhile motive in anything. I have to guard against that.

MS. THOMAS: I can see ourselves as believers. We have enough for a book on them in terms of skepticism, but we still are believers. Every day we go to the White House we expect to get the truth, we work to get the truth, and we put out what we can get.

MR. DEAKIN: You know what reporters at the White House are, or reporters covering city hall or the governor or anybody else? They're just like the American people in one respect. They all live by Dr. Johnson's dictum. Dr. Johnson said, "Mankind lives from hope to hope." The last hope is always disappointed but you live for that next one.

MS. THOMAS: I don't think you see cynics in the press corps.

MR. DEAKIN: Every time the president goes on television and makes his pitch and defends his programs, he has access to the American people to make his case, in that one-way communication we were talking about. And every time that happens, the press is saying implicitly: OK, we'll give you the benefit of the doubt. Tell us. We give you the facility, we give you time on the air waves, we give you the space in the newspaper, every time we print that State of the Union message, that budget message, that economic report—in all of it, we're saying we're giving you the benefit of the doubt. Tell us what you plan to do; tell us your reasons for it. We are not saying to you, no, no, we don't believe it from the beginning so we won't print it and we won't put it on TV.

I mean, what are we talking about here folks? There's one hell of a lot of cooperation and help, sheer help for the president from the press. We're not out there destroying this guy from the moment he gets in. We're giving him that time on TV to make his case. He may raise hell about the instant analysis that comes afterward. In the days when they were really attacking instant analysis, during the Nixon administration, people were saying, how come they let David Brinkley and Eric Sevareid and the other pundits come on right after the president and pick everything he says to pieces? It's a liberal conspiracy to destroy this man, to destroy the president,

conveniently ignoring the fact that the president had just spent half an hour on national television making *his* case.

MS. THOMAS: And sometimes the analysis isn't picking it apart; it's simply saying, to sum up, this is what he's saying and what they'll do and so forth.

MR. JONES: Does the scepticism drive the determination of truth? In any one event there are a number of truths depending on how people see it.

MS. THOMAS: Neither Jim Deakin nor I really touched on the fact that there obviously is a handbook of cliché answers handed down from one press secretary to another to avoid telling you anything, to avoid telling you the truth sometimes but to avoid maybe outright lying: "I have no knowledge of that," "I'm not aware of that," etc. Then Larry Speakes has developed this. If you ask what you think is a telling question because he put something on the table—now, about the budget and so forth, Speakes came out and said we've narrowed the differences. He took the line that Baker had given him. Well, they had not narrowed the differences at all. And then when you challenge him the next day it goes on. On Friday when the unemployment figures came out, ten million unemployed, and so forth he stated the Reagan line because it's all the Democrats' fault. I claim that it's George Washington's fault.

MR. DEAKIN: Yes, because you can work every one of these all the way back.

MS. THOMAS: And so it was the Democrats' fault and so forth and Reagan has always said when the ten percent cut comes in on July 1 that's when his program will work. To Speakes I said, "Now you say that the Democrats are at fault but you are predicting an up-turn now. My question is, when does Reagan take responsibility for the economy, for the country, for whatever is happening? Can he say on July 1 that this is the date, this is the deadline?" He refused to answer. If you knew the frustration. Scepticism, we don't even have enough scepticism. You are constantly being defied on simple questions.

MR. DEAKIN: You know Lady Bird had to ask the Secret Service whether Lyndon Johnson was going to Texas. If you think we have trouble getting information—his own wife.

MR. CORMIER: On the question of scepticism versus possible truth, it seems to me that it is a truism that when the White House or the president says something it's much the same as Joe McCarthy the first time waving the list of alleged Communists. If what he says is wrong, it takes time for the press to catch up with the fact that he's wrong. His story is reported, more often than not, undiluted, first crack out of the box. Then reporters are skeptical, they start wondering, then you may get the follow-up stories that say, well maybe it isn't quite that way.

MS. THOMAS: That's the story of the disability, the man in the Virginia area. Reagan gave an interview for the *Oklahoma Daily*, they were very, very sympathetic. They said "You're right, Mr. President." He brought up that he's always being accused that these cuts in benefits are hurting people, he brought up this man who applied for disability, was offered a job and he wouldn't work, and how the government was really being taken. Well, his story stayed for a day or two. Then a few of us began to check into this question, the man was being interviewed, and he was sort of arbitrarily taken off of disability. The story is not unique. But they proceeded to show that this was—actually the cuts had come about through the Carter administration. They failed to say that Reagan had accelerated the program where there would be less inspection of anyone's right to have disability or not.

And then they read the social security regulations which will astound you. It seems that this man was a worker, a welder, and he had been hit on the head so he suffered from seizures and became progressively bad. The Social Security regulation said that he did not have enough seizures to merit payments! Then you say how many seizures does he have to have? Anyway, Frank's point is right, that the president can say something and then it takes you three days, if you have a reporter who wanted to follow it up, to see if it is true.

MR. DEAKIN: Only in recent years have people in Nevada and Utah, particularly Utah, begun filing suits against the government over atomic tests that the government said at the time were harmless. One-way communication, the government's version, the government's statement, the government's version of the truth. The press in this case didn't exercise scepticism. It accepted the official version. Now thirty years later we find that the leukemia rate among

children in those Utah communities is scores of times higher than the national average, and people are dying off like flies. They're dying at forty instead of living to seventy. Only now, thirty years too late, are some reporters beginning to exercise skepticism, and even then it was only when the suits began to be filed. Often we can't find out. But if the skepticism wasn't there we would *never* find out.

MR. CORMIER: The hope is in the skepticism.

MR. YOUNG: I've read two articles recently, one by Tony Lewis and one by somebody, I forget who, out of the *New York Times* who was reporting on the Congress, on the mood of the Congress. And I would just like to have your comments about this in the context of your discussion. One of the points that Tony Lewis made in his article, it was on reportage, was about Reagan. You're undoubtedly familiar with it and I think I remember that one of the points he made was that, he was asking why the press was being so kind to Reagan when they know the truth about his state of mind, about his ability, and so on. It was rather striking and I didn't know quite what to make of it. It may have something to do with the honeymoon, maybe he's all off base—I would just like your comments about it.

The other thing I want to ask you about, the article on Congress, was a betrayal of the mood and mind-set of a certain group of newbreed congressmen, and one of them was quoted as saying, or words to this effect, that the President lies.

MS. THOMAS: Who says that?

MR. YOUNG: One of the congressmen quoted. And I wonder if that mood, if you'd encountered it. What do you do with that as a reporter?

MR. DEAKIN: If you say something in the newspaper or on television, and you can't document it, your editor will take that statement out, if he's on the ball. I get asked all the time, why didn't the press print anything about John F. Kennedy's sex life, the fact that he was chasing women all the time? How, since this always comes from the far right, I always answer: For the same reason we didn't print anything about Nixon's drinking. But the fact is if we couldn't document it we couldn't print it.

MR. YOUNG: I was struck by the fact that it was a reporter writing this statement.

MR. DEAKIN: Tony Lewis is very liberal. But Tony Lewis in this instance was forgetting the fact that if you can't document something, you can't print it. Look at the trouble the *Washington Post* got in when it printed something that its editors had let get by without demanding that the reporter document it; demanding to know who's your source when you say you've discovered this eight-year-old heroin addict named Jimmy. They didn't do it. They got themselves in terrible trouble.

MS. THOMAS: We don't write our personal opinions. Tony is absolutely wrong. His only perceptions of Reagan come through us. He's never there. He doesn't man the barricade. Far from it. He's off in the Middle East or somewhere else. What he knows about the President we have told him. And we have told him as factually as possible.

I believe in objective reporting. I believe there is certainly a place for it, and there's certainly a place for Tony. I love his writing, but I think he's absolutely wrong. In those euphoric moments after presidents become presidents, we may say, let him get his feet wet; but the question of judging him every day—we lay it down: this president has said this. And other reporters take off from there and see if it's so or not. But, "He said, he added," is still first.

MR. CORMIER: Let me get in something here. I know of only one instance where the White House press corps has semi-grappled with something that we did not want to write about on a president's trip. And that was when Jerry Ford was first in office. It sometimes seemed to us that he took a martini or two too many and we wondered how do we deal with this? Well, he went up to Boston and made a speech and *Newsweek*—I must say it was the only publication with the guts to do it—simply made an offhand reference to him slurring his words when he spoke. I never saw Jerry Ford approaching insobriety again.

MR. THOMPSON: You did draw a number of examples from foreign policy? Does that mean—maybe this is a "When did you stop beating your wife?" type question—that you would have doubts about the distinction between foreign policy matters and domestic policy matters? It is often argued that there are some issues where you, the reporter, can't expect to get to the heart of the issue when serious business is going on? It concerned Camp David, and presumably it concerns some of the negotiations going on now? Are

there some constraints on what the reporters can find out, necessarily, about foreign policy, given its nature? Should there be a possibility for an administration, when highly sensitive issues and negotiations are in a make or break stage, to get away from reporters and get away from publicity?

MS. THOMAS: I believe in an almost total open society. I believe that we should know as much as possible about foreign policy, particularly when the President himself says you have seventeen minutes to get out of town before the bomb falls. I think the people should be alert as to what's happening. I think too much is suppressed. I would want no blocks in the legitimacy of the pursuit of trying to find out what they're doing in the foreign policy field. Perhaps there are some very legitimate military secrets and I don't think we ever really try to pull those. We try to find out what's going on. So much was suppressed and there was so much deception in Vietnam, for example. Those kind of things. The President has an NSC meeting, national security council meeting, maybe once a week, sometimes more. He will never say it's an emergency meeting and will never give you the topic. And once in a while you'll want to leak it, as three newspapers, for example, had on Thursday I think it was, that Reagan would propose a fifty-fifty equal deterrent and so forth. The story obviously came from the same source and had been placed with about three papers. My feeling is that we should try to find out as much as possible and that certainly foreign policy and national security should not be off-limits. I don't understand why the Americans will be hurt if they find out what's going on.

MR. DEAKIN: Well, skepticism as far as journalists are concerned, is based on experience. You know, there's a collective memory that journalists have when they have been in Washington for a long time, a greater memory of what's happened before than some people who are coming in for the first time to run the government, people who've never been in Washington before, which is usually the case with each new administration. So, reporters have a collective memory of these things that administrations usually don't have, unless they bring in a lot of old hands. And the collective memory that the journalists have is of time after time after time, instance after instance after instance, in which the government claimed that the security of the nation would be impaired or

endangered if certain information were made public. Then the information was made public, did get into the press, and *nothing happened*. There was never the slightest evidence that it was of any aid to any adversary or enemy of the United States. Nobody took advantage of us in some negotiations or threatened us with any kind of military or nuclear blackmail. In other words, all the dangers that the government said would happen if certain information were made public did not materialize. They all turned out to be chimeras. So we get very skeptical about this claim of national security.

The classic instance, and I'm going to give you several, was the Pentagon Papers. The *New York Times* had obtained the Pentagon Papers. The Nixon administration wasn't even involved in the Pentagon Papers; they didn't cover the Nixon administration. Nevertheless, after an initial period of trying to figure out what to do, they went to court and got an injunction against the *New York Times* and subsequently other newspapers on the grounds that the publication of the Pentagon Papers would endanger the national security. It went all the way to the Supreme Court and it was very narrowly held that the *New York Times* and the other papers had the right to publish the Pentagon Papers. And so the rest of the Pentagon Papers came out and all this danger to national security didn't materialize. It wasn't there.

Let me give you two or three other examples. After Johnson left the presidency he was interviewed by Walter Cronkite. And Cronkite asked Johnson whether his last secretary of defense, Clark Clifford, had been responsible for the bombing pause in Vietnam. I don't know Johnson's motives, but apparently he didn't want Clifford to get the credit for having advocated and persuaded Johnson to stop the bombing of North Vietnam. So in an effort to show that it was not Clifford who had done this, Johnson pulled a document out of his pocket—and this was before a national television audience—and he read this paper which showed that on such and such a date he, Johnson, had ordered the study of possible alternatives to the bombing. And Johnson announced—he didn't imply it, he stated it explicitly—that this was a classified document, a national security document. And he wasn't even president at the time; he was a former president. He simply declassified this document on national television and read it to the American people. He did this constantly in press conferences, especially the press confer-

ences he had on the lawn. He would pull out something and it was classified, a CIA report or a Pentagon report, and because it served his purpose to give out the information he declassified it on the spot. Other presidents have done similar things many times—leaking national security information. The Reagan administration has done it whenever it suited their purpose.

Now, the question that arises is this: If the information was such that it imperiled or might imperil the security of the United States, but the next moment it was no threat to the American people so it could be declassified, then what are we supposed to say national security is? And what we come down to, unfortunately, is that national security consists of what the president says it is at any given moment. But that is a very relative kind of definition. It's not a very absolute kind of definition. It's not something you can rely on very much.

MS. THOMAS: And it's also so that the people will not get in on the dialogue. They will not be able to say anything. It is a *fait accompli*, any time they want to make a decision, nobody else is able to get in on it and decide whether it's right or wrong.

MR. DEAKIN: Or if they do get in on it they only get in on the government's terms. It declassifies the information and gives it out. One-way communication. Let me give you another example. Johnson held a summit meeting with Premier Kosygin in Glassboro, New Jersey. It was all secret. The reporters weren't told anything. All we got was, you know, the length of the meeting. We weren't told what they talked about, what the results were or anything else because, of course, that would affect national security; that was a national security matter. So as soon as it was over Johnson flew to Texas and he invited Max Frankel, who was then covering the White House for the *New York Times*, out to the ranch. They take a swim together and Johnson is standing in the water and proceeds to give Frankel a one-hour report on everything that was discussed at the summit meeting. And Frankel is free to use it. So what is this national security stuff?

Here is another example. George Christian, who was Johnson's press secretary for the last two years, attended the so-called troika meeting that Johnson held every Friday morning with McNamara and Rostow, in which they made Vietnam policy. He was there every Friday for two years. But we never could get one word out of

Christian about what was said in those meetings until they were ready to announce something. If they had something to announce, they announced it. But we could never find out what the pros and cons were, what considerations they were weighing, what their thinking was, what they were doing. Not a word—couldn't get a word out of them for two solid years. Then Johnson leaves office and Christian writes a book. And Max Frankel talks about this book in his deposition in the Pentagon Papers case, and Frankel says there are seventy pages of that book that contain classified information. We couldn't be given it at the time, the American people couldn't be given it, but he could put it in a book.

MR. THOMPSON: Do you think there would have been a Camp David agreement if reporters had been allowed to mingle with the negotiators?

MS. THOMAS: Of course. It was just a question of Carter twisting Begin's arm off. We all knew it was going on. I don't understand why it had to be so secret. We were never allowed to even send one photographer there in—how long was it? More than a week. No, I don't see why all this had to be in total secrecy.

MR. DEAKIN: The American people have to pay for these decisions. They've got to pay for them, either in money or blood or loss of affluence or whatever it may be. They've got to pay for it. But they're not going to be told about it until, as Helen says, it is a *fait accompli*.

MS. THOMAS: Why should it be twenty-five years later in a White Paper. What good's that?

MR. THOMPSON: If my wife and I have any difficulties we have to work it out and the best chance for working it out is in private.

MS. THOMAS: Yes, but you don't control millions of people and their fates.

MR. THOMPSON: Well, the method is the same and we've learned that the open covenants openly arrived at works if the open arrived part isn't emphasized too much.

MS. THOMAS: I don't agree at all.

MR. CORMIER: I would throw in one thing here. Without defending the secrecy there, we were suddenly in a position of dealing with

we won't tell you anything, they get that much more energetic in trying to find out something. But if they're given a little something, it takes the heat off. The analogy is with Bismarck. Otto was no liberal, but what he did with the Social Democratic party in Germany was to throw them a little bone here, a little bone there, a little bit of social welfare. Milk for nursing mothers. And what happened was that it quieted the Social Democrats in the Bundestag. It toned them down because he gave them a little something. If you do this with reporters, you'll get pretty much the same result.

MR. CORMIER: We're easily manipulated.

MR. JONES: In this national security area, I wonder if there are some limits. I watched the marvelous program on Oppenheimer. Is that a case, the development of a weapon during the kind of war that World War II was, is that a case where the press should not report, that we should insist on secrecy?

MS. THOMAS: I think it would have been much safer for the Japanese to know, that might have stopped a lot of killing.

MR. DEAKIN: The reason for it was because it was wartime and there was a censorship program. It was a voluntary censorship program that the press adhered to almost completely. There was the exception of the *Chicago Tribune* with the Japanese Purple Code. Otherwise this massive institution, the American press, adhered to the voluntary censorship program with practically one hundred percent compliance and the secret Manhattan project was kept secret throughout the entire war.

MR. CORMIER: But not by us. It was kept by the government.

MR. DEAKIN: Well, they also did a very good job of keeping the secret.

MS. THOMAS: Well, my point is maybe if it had been publicized that such a bomb existed finally and the U.S. was ready to use it maybe the Japanese could have saved themselves.

MR. DEAKIN: There's a problem with that, Helen, because if that had happened and it had got back to Hitler then we might have pushed Hitler into developing the atomic bomb.

MR. CORMIER: There is a sense of limits. I'm not quite sure what it is.

MR. DEAKIN: There have to be limits. But if the press is asked to exercise sound judgment and agree to limits, especially in wartime, then the government has to understand that there are limits on the limitation of information. Instead, we've come to the point now where everything is classified.

MR. JONES: Oftentimes one comes away from something like that Oppenheimer program with all of us saying that maybe there should have been more consideration—

MS. THOMAS: My feeling is that I have found out that any time a big secret has been revealed it has been more helpful to world knowledge and more important than the harm it does.

MR. BLACKFORD: Back in 1956 the CIA got Khrushchev's speech. And we still don't know how they got it. Does it make any difference?

MS. THOMAS: Out of Warsaw, huh?

MR. BLACKFORD: Does it make any difference how they got it out? The news is the speech, is it not?

MS. THOMAS: That's right. It's interesting in a replay of how it did happen but that wouldn't be the big part. The speech was the important thing and it really shocked the world.

MR. DEAKIN: But you can turn that one around and you can say ah, hah! Isn't that an obvious example where national security should have been maintained? Shouldn't that have been a closely held secret? We shouldn't have let the Russians know that we had that kind of intelligence, expertise, and facilities. But no, as soon as it suits the government's purpose to have it out, it comes out—and that's the point about national security. National security ceases to exist the moment the government decides that the information will be of some assistance to it.

We've seen this now with Reagan over and over and over again. Stuff that was absolutely secret classified information is suddenly released. Weinberger did it with the Soviet capability assessment. One moment something is top secret. The next moment they can use it, so they put it out.

MS. THOMAS: They flipped out when there was a report that we were helping the British [in the Falklands] with intelligence. They really flipped out. All kinds of running around finding the leakers

and stuff. I think that most Americans would assume we are helping the British with intelligence. So I don't understand those kinds of mentality.

V

Conclusion

1200 WASH CONGRESSIONAL -

washed → return to head - press says
"trachea and ~~other~~ tubes"

John Adams & 1st journalist - Haynes - latter
Jefferson - paradox praised press - greatest
concept for the press.

Andrew Jackson \rightarrow press takes a turn \rightarrow press, "hotter"

1st to make press acct. → liked press
Amir Knidel gave every jobs to
journalists → post master general
in border

Lincoln → great press, Horace Greeley liked,
other press → natter, babble,
He liked the press

Andrew Johnson → 1st full scale presidential interview

V.S. Grt.

Hinges - punch
cleverly - sized & chisel out of need lock

Teddy Roosevelt - master press agent
set up 1st White House press room..
Concentrated on making impressions
through news stories.

Taft - uncomfortable ~~for~~ w/ the press

W. Wilson - smartest Phil Law degree -
got message ... looked down on the press
invented the Presidential Press Conference
perfected

Large success = relation to the press -
but press = untrustworthy

Hendrix - publisher, big blunder - 24 hr
advance on press conference questions
brought in anonymous sources - "White
House spokesmen said ..."

Coolidge

Hoover - press conference, HN didn't
talk w/ Amer. people is economy
slid

master publicist
FDR - controlled the news - "If I were
you I'd write the story this way."

998 FDR

324 Truman

64 JFK

press conferences

1st PC. → answered all questions

Truman → hotbedder → no education
very honest - saw FDR twice.

Eisenhower

quote president at length
Radio + TV. script changed } script reviewed
could not relate to the press. } before broadcast

JFK - live news conferences - handled the
press better than any man

LBJ - most powerful senator in U.S. history
held ~~same~~ 1st of the moment press conference.
loved ~~the~~ "hand-holding" the press

Ford

39 PCs

see

Carter

- 2 hr phone-in
- 14 pt. every two weeks

The test

- 1 Radio / TV
- 2 review page → p. 196
- 3 list of names - important people (mostly
last 2 sections)

radio - work of lobbyist

heavily of radiotelephony
now

WRT → kick to radio development
Radio → b

Conrad

newspaper reaction

why NBC?

how ABC / CBS came about

FCC → 1934 Comm Act. gives radio

TV

Bill Paley → heads of each network

TV news / Edward R. Murrow -

1st controversial TV news

entertainment spectrum - Gene Shere

Red Channels

Detectors

Vietnam - press & public
" " military
impact of TV in war report

(Griffith
Franklin -
Greely - Shuklin
Thompson - Ads)

media questions

~~Reagan - long hours work
- distance w/ press because
handlers~~

Helmut Thomas -

Reagan longer hours work - assassination attempt
→ press kid gloves - not shooting
Lt obvious contradiction

→ early days open admin - can't work
campaign practice, tough to cover -
willing to answer but ...

Active taking - ~~if~~ air traffic controller
→ no more questions
(access controlled) ~~no~~ 1985 → 9 news
conferences - not FDR vs. Nixon
only

Barbados

The Commodity President → Reagan
~~the~~ the standards about what the
president has to do to survive.

11/28 thoughts - the yappy & the guppy - everyone
 makes fun of them - living off the
 Eisenhower dollar ~~and~~ during the Reagan
 years - Single most important word: Credit.
 Single most unbelievable concept - Balance due...

A. Dictators & Freedom - During wartime

42-39
 39
 81

- Civil War
 - WWI
 - WWII
 - Vietnam - War on TV
- Cooperation between press & govt
- amendment Freedom of the press

- B. D S F expression - C. Home - Joe McCarthy
- C. Perceive National Security thru prior restraint
- Pentagon Papers
 - Selling S in Pentagon
- D. Crisis & Credibility: Watergate -

- 2

- 3 stages of dev of Civil War Military Censorship
- 1- Demand by Post Office & messages sent to enemy vessels
 - 2- Censor taken from State Dept. & put under the direction of the Secretary of War
 - 3- Total cooperation of press from 1864 to the end of the war

WWI - Censorship War

- ~~sinking~~ sinking of ~~British~~ Lusitania
- German U-boats declare open seas prey
- Zimmerman telegraph
- relationship w/ England
- 3 American ships sunk

April 2 -

(A.) - Propaganda Efforts

1. Wilson Committee on Public Information
2. Disseminate facts about war
3. Coordinate govt prop. efforts

Espionage Act 6/15/17

- (1) Suppression of those considered disloyal
- (2) Fines/imprisonment willful false reports
w/ intent w/

- Trading w/ the Enemy Act Oct. 1917
→ authorized censorship in/art of US.
- Sedition Act May 1918
crime to write or publish any remarks

Walt - how to End All Wars

Office of War Information
institutes voluntary press censorship
monitoring mail/cable/radio between
US & other countries

Censorship

Byron Price - executive member of AP →
director of Office of Censorship.

Office of War Information
→ city desk - clearing house of info -
Elmer Davis - NY Times

total cooperation
except William Kennedy - Chicago - AP - spilled beans
about the news ending

emergency TV \Rightarrow govt had to control it

B. Govt (military) vs. the press

- 1/ Defense Sect. Robt. McNamara employed
to find body count stats to prove
enemy exhaustion

2 -

- 1963 - Time Mag. Saigon Press Corp
no propaganda plotting Dien Bien Phu

- Journalists \Rightarrow David Halberstam /
Neil Sheehan / William Brown NY Times
lecture / write books

- nature of conflict / danger U.S. victory at
any cost.

Horley Safer Aug 1965 of two Vietnamese
photographers "The Burning of the Village of
Can Ne."

(a) US Marines being fired upon levels
150 metres

(b) 3 women wounded / baby killed / wounded
marine / old man as prisoner

Harrison Salisbury - we're losing ^{US military} ^{young} American
people vs. press → TV no right to interfere w/
US military actions.

→ Nixon → Agnew on the road.

- TV/newspaper exercise too much influence
over public opinion

- "Eastern Establishment bias" can't tell difference
between news & comment

→ criticism of press by high govt official

~~From~~ Front: 1950s & (Joseph McCarthy.)

McCarthy list 205 communists in State Dept
communists → socialist → liberalist → democrat =
communists

US press become wimpy vs. McCarthy -

Hollywood Blacklist -

Edward R. Gurnow → Radclerich -
takes on McCarthy
press won't do his job.

↓
(The Dissolving Community)
power & TV)

2

period 45-52 (seven yrs)

52 parts in place
A. National setting -

1. US #1 world power
2. confusion & exploitation → consumption
3. military personnel food war market
4. millions of war-damaged marriages
5. industry endeavor invest-management
states → transportation

~~4.~~ ~~reputation~~ search for reds TV

6. post war inflation

7. Hollywood Red interhunt

B. ~~US~~ international journalism

1. US caught up international transition

2. Cold War Berlin rift - 48-49

3. Korean conflict '50

→ TV industry.

Farnsworth/

1890-1920 - European/American network
in image broadcast.

C. Johnson MW-101 3116 -
M 13-1500 T 1600-1700
W 900-1100 F by gpt.

TV & Hist.

1952 → TV

- A. Amer. in transition
- B. TV's early devel
- C. TV's growth
- D. Early TV stat.
 - local prog
 - network prog
 - chng. in ant. prog
 - decade of change
- E. TV Invasion
 - I. Broadcasters
 - Morrow & Friendly: tech. Heds. of broadcast journalism
- F. TV in Amer. Cult

electronic

mechanical

scansion

525 horizontal linesPaul Nipkow - 1884 German1) device ~~to scan~~ to scan picture (spinning disk)

2) set of mechanical search

3) disciples of mech. means

- Herbert E. Ives (AT&T) prior 1927 bell labs

- 4 wire photo - 1000 miles 1st still/motion picture
transmission radio - coaxial cable - art door

chance

b) John L. Baird

1927 - Great Britain - built on

P. Nipkow's device

1928 London to NY - man's image
using short wave bandc) Charles Francis Jenkins

1) dependent on numerous moving parts

2) 1923 use wireless image P. Pres. Harding
from WASH DC to Philly3) 60 lines resolution (lines 48 lines)
(US 525)

4

Electronic David Sarnoff

1923 - kinescope ~~radio~~ ~~vacuum~~ ~~tube~~
Vladimir Zworykin

1. 1924 - invented kinescope (cathode ray tube)
2. core of a receiving unit
3. joins RCA research team

Philo Farnsworth (L.A.)

1. 1923 outlines a system of electronic TV
2. 100 - 150 line definition

1936 - Berlin ^{class} - Landsberg → 1939 W6X4Z
1939 - FDR 1st to appear on TV

1947 - 12 KTLA

'39 - 3" - 12" TVs \$150 - \$600

48 - 190,000 TVs

52 - 32,500,000 TVs

'55 - 65% of TVs

programming

- Local prog. → eg. KTLA
1. movies - give em the old films including silent movies 30's
 2. short musical films - virtual disc jockey shows
 3. travelogues
 4. produce local prog -
 - soap operas
 - children

Network prog.

- Bristol Myers - 1st Network sponsor
- ① → content - old radio shows eg. Amos & Andy - simulcast
 - ② → superstar programs: eg. Milton Berle
 - Texaco celebrity star theater
 - Toast of the Town → Ed Sullivan show
 - ③ Dramatic program anthology / series
 - golden age of TV drama
 - playhouse 90 ...



(-6-)

Wd

A. William Paley & CBS

- Philosophy got the biggest stars
- captured lead in prime time & ratings 50-70

B. Sylvester L. (Pat) Weaver & WBC

- Philosophy: magazine concept - control prog & leave adv. space
- advanced spectacles

C. Boone Arkledge & ABC

- Philosophy - sports coverage required sport prog.

Prominent studios → 1950s detective movies
77 sunset strip ~~the~~ Hawaiian eye

Quiz Shows - Network to local level
CBS replaces Edward R. Morrow w/ quiz shows

"\$64,000 Question" 1955 (time 7th) 41.1 million
rating, Amer. show Americans for
big bucks

"\$64,000 Challenge" Revelation

"21" "Dot-o"

1957-8 Quiz Shows becoming old...

Unusual - shows rigged

20 quiz shows pulled off the air w/ days
NY grand jury → FCC congressional hearing.

Charles Doren → confessed to cheating
Columbia college professor - this & wife → 5 yrs. later
speaks -




Quiz shows dropped

① CBS reports
"See it now"

→ Chk caused laughter

Congressional
Committee
reports



record industry → payola / plugola scandals

TVs including Dick Clark...

TV both deliberately propping products
agreement for more public service programs.

1950-60 movement to commercialize
US → rigged TV shows outlawed

"Amos & Andy" racial integration, horrendous
stereotyping.

~~Singer~~ ~~Another's~~ Brothers - Political statements
(CBS - Pete Seeger folk singer singer
controversial anti-war song.)

Low Grant show Top-10 turn off the air

Adapt S TV news (Fred L. Harris &
Fred Friendly)

- ① NBC - John Cheron Sweeney - (15 minutes) 1956
CBS - Douglas Edwards - 1962
networker

Huntley/Brinkley

3 10 minute programs w/ section/sports
1/2 hr. show ~~with~~ had show

- ② special events

Walt Arthur coming home
San Fran. conference and
Congressional Hearings - Org. Crime
Frank Connelo

- ③ Public Affairs - "See It Now" harrow & Friendly
weekly 1/2 hr ~~program~~

8,000 letters

↓ 5 wks later - Gradulatch - returned ..
↓ by airforce
TV journalism

'54 → CBS asked E. Nixon why he wasn't
sure to watch every week

Openheimer interview

Alcoa - Texas land scandal to end

GM → VP questions Nixon

↓ Fred Friendly "Due to Circumstances Beyond
Our Control"

Network felt it must give equal time -
Nixon disagreed & quit.

Importance of TV news -

TV real sense = American Culture.

Phy/museum/book

literil & the illiterate

cultural wasteland = force of culture

people & plenty - mass society.
media technology - twisted culture Boorstein

Thurs Area & Potter - 11-

TV is free in Amer. life
cultural trend influenced by TV:

- 1 - Unsur & entertainment
24 hr diversion, 1st est. media in
service (series, public affairs notes)
- 2 - Homogenized National Culture -
(urban inroads -
collection of regions overrun by national
force - love & se share street)
3. Social / Cultural Values - attitude toward sex
1982 PBS - Holiday Potter - not unattracted
work snapp - Elvis Presley on Sullivan Show
Snatch Bros
- 4 Learning & Emotional development: children reading
less learning more knowing word
5. TV & Politics -
FDR - modern media
TV follows media events - Bush
"what's going to be on the news tomorrow?"

TV w/ Xerox → personal TV.
to long documentary = "hard to remember"
in 1/2 hr. comedies

10/27

LIST of ADS / AD AGENCIES

CULTURE = ADVERTISING

political ad

(Jameson "Protecting the Presidency")

Basic ad - ads - genesis -

ADVERTISING "A PRIVILEGED FORM OF DISCOURSE"

- ORIGIN & Development

- 1789 - 19th NEWSPAPER

- 1845 - 1900 MAGAZINES

- 1900 - 45 Radio

- 45 - 70 TV

AD AGENCIES

1840-50 Newspaper Agency State

1850-60 Spec. Advertising Agency State

1860 - Spec. Advertising

Late 1860's Advertising Concession

→ Paid persuasion by use mass communication

16,000 ads per day

Must look

George Rowell & Ethical Considerations
Francis Ayer & " "

Develop of Ad Copywriting

John B. Powers' Style of Ad Writing
Hard Sell Style: Reasoning Ad
Soft Sell Style

Market Advice via Market Research

Must of Ad ~~the~~ Advert.: Selling of Residences

Ad Professions

Ad = privileged discourse = virtue

"this is how you should (now) live . . ."

clergy - religion
political
advertising

Origins of Dev. . . .


Newspapers - Colonial/revolutionary/party press

proliferate S. Adams party
support Newspaper

news -
papers
no diff
news & opinion

Henry Pass - 1830

(James Gordon Bennett) - Ad department - Display



1865-1900 - MAGAZINE

← ~~PATENTED~~ MEDICINES →
EARLY DAYS = NO ADS

~~WALTER DILL~~

W. WALTER DILLER JR. → BROUGHT AD SPACE IN MAGAZINES

1900

~~Radio~~ Radio

TV

Walter Diller Jr.

Seven Basic Functions of Political Ads

- 1) to create interest in the candidate
- 2) to build name recognition
- 3) to stimulate citizens participation
- 4) to provide motivation for candidate support
- 5) to identify key issues & frame questions for public debate
- 6) to demonstrate talents of the candidate
- 7) to provide entertainment.

political ad = new kid on the block

what kind of America has this produced?

Propaganda & Ads = Amer. Culture
at colonial fell for ad campaign
about America ~~was~~ paradise. New Americans
very gullible → propaganda

Four CULTURAL FRAMES

1. IDOLATRY (1890-1925)

strong sense of product veneration
generated by industry's new strength
advert sell strategies

2. ICONOLOGY (1925-45)

focus point = ind. user rather than
product → ~~brand to user~~ ^{authority} ~~quality~~

3. Narcissism (1945-65)

(consumer encourage what product can
do for you -

Totalism (1965-present)

id of features of 3 previous periods are
recalled & synthesized. within product
it's user - ~~process~~

Votzweil idea = minority voting.

Andy -

movies

Woody Allen "Another woman" Fri.
Jody Foster/Kelly McGillis "The Accused"
Billy Crystal "Memories of me"
"Alien Nation"
"Track 29" Costa Mesa 751-4184
Town Center

VZ → "Rattle & Hum"

Concerts { Irvine Meadows 11/14
Sade Pacific Sup. Oct 17th
Kathy Valentine (gogo) Postnuclear 10/28 11/15
Tina Turner Dwayne The Ventura Theater (805) 648-1936
Georgina Stellas The Palace 11/4
Coach House: Mark Walker 10/14
Arlo Guthrie 10/16, 17
Shadowfax 10/20
Bob Dylan 10/25
Georgina Stellas 11/5
Jay Leno Celebrity Theater 11/20

11/14

(35)

(35) totenson (D) current ad age

(36) (D) neck rackets

(41) candle grass sec.

Radio & its promise.

Dev. of Radio - 7 Phases

~~communications~~ 3 ~~was~~ phases

Radio developed by hobbyists - G.B. workers
fiddling around at home - how do you
find patent holders

radiotelephonic communications

Pooling during WWI

radio stations

Industrial firms interested in Communications

F.C.A.

Networks

Federal Regulations: Upatnce & FCC

Intermedia Competition Radio Entertainment

Electricity Edison's contribution
Telegraphy S.B. Morse & A.G. Bell
Telephony Bell (Philadelphia exhibition)
wireless telegraphy

↓
marconi

maxwell discovered
radio waves
~~maxwell~~ hertzian
waves.

KDKA

1890 radio stations open by charles
wendell forss as Detroit WJLB

~~1890 radio stations open by charles~~
(A + T) But for

9/26

California Journalism	Colton } Californian
A. Pioneer Press in California	Sample
B. A California Dynasty <u>The Times</u>	San Francisco Californian Star
L.A.	

pre 1870 - dusty cattle town - most violent city in the country

1864 - drought → 1st Cal. Land Boom
econ - transformation

1871 - 1st Bank/FIREB DEPT. ... → business interest

Borden - Hearst [Brewster]

wrote glowing things re: L.A.

1881 L.A. Daily Times - 4 p. wk - Dec. 4 - 400 copies
Hearst

(owners walk out - printers continue for a month)

1 (Harrison Gray Otis) 1882-1917 - big cabin, 14, Ohio, printer
The Frontier party press - Democrat - quits after Breckinridge
St. Louis Journal - Lincoln - army Lt. Col.
Sister Barbara -

~~Daily Times~~ → objective: couldn't work w/ him. needed money - paid off original investors -

w/ Col. N.H. Boyce (\$) \$40,000 to buy out 3 partners controlling share. Bought Boyce in 3 years -

buys Los Angeles Tribune - Day/Bennett → call each other names.

Otis philosophy → hated refugees / unions

1944

③ Norma Chandler - Transitional man -
L.A. This one of the worst in the U.S. (1 of 10
worst @: life) - Otis & N. Chandler - used newspaper
to ~~make money~~ - aka party press

city pop 1.4 million - Pasadena freeway

(Buffy Buffums) more guts than Otis/N. Chandler/W.C.

compete w/ Hearst → Herald Express
Mirror (tabloid)

→ Concert Hall - Music Center (9 acres) L.A. Supervisor

Kyle Palmer & Kuyper - politicians went to Kyle

(4) ~~Norma Chandler~~ Palmer - wanted Richard Nixon
political editor -

~~then~~ his wife/entertainment/better writing

N. hired Nick Williams - writing editor 1958

(4) Otis Chandler - Innovator

Stanford Track Star - Circulation -

Mirror - success #/not ledger → publisher -

editorial → no more best reporters - general
assignments reporters

society page - marketing research - wire service
w/ N.Y. Post. 60's - 70's

Contribution - mer-wasp

213-594-9508

1882- Otis - Chandler

39960766

Veronica

MT FINANCIAL
【\$2935.75】

payoff for 10/3/88

[10/3]

(1) PHILIP STAVES - 1st Journalist

(12) B John Campbell - 1st cont. w/p

(15) all commerce

(16)

(29)

73 (A)

(35)

(40) Pittizer article

FBI - 9-4

SD - (?)

includ C. Crow

media exchange -

- played into the non-local affairs. before A.P. ...
PA - telegraph communication
committee of correspondents, San Antonio.

Expansion to the West.


Founded / Creation of L.A. by L.A. Times
Distribution - Harry Gray & Co. -
Financed -

brought water
film industry
port
aircraft industry
music center
→ Richard Nixon

Chandler

more specific - news service w/ WASH

past.



Social Responsibility of the Press

- A) 3 waves of concentration
- B) Social Responsibility
- C) Concentration of Ownership
 - 1. 1910 - 1930
 - 2. 1930 - 1980's
- D) Chain Ownership

3 WAVES:

Penny Press - 1833 Focus on mass interest
Guided Age - 1897 Self-Advertising
Jazz Journalism - 1920 - Emphasis on tabloids & photography
Daily News 1st newspaper - NY - tabloid
Robert McCormick - Chicago Tribune
Herbert (Patterson) -
1919 200,000 → 20,000 second month.
\$750,000

with \$750,000 profit were press - A.P.
1950 - America's question - type of the press
→ Smith Commission of the
Freedom of the press.
by headlines people tired of it.

Social Responsibility -
obligation of the press to report the true.
Does the media today represent true picture.

Intermedia Advert competition 1930-80s

- 1) # of dailies \rightarrow 1,700
- 2) ownership concentration
- 3) circulation \rightarrow

\rightarrow Singleton / T. Turner / Murdoch ...

The Other Media ... magazines & book publishing

10/17

Consolidate Argue Practicality

W1st week Advertising - affect on culture

History of Motion Pictures - one of 2 art
forms developed in 20th century (other
being still-pictures) -
TV = distribution means -

imp of film = viewed for the artistic/
propaganda aspect
→ originally developed for observing
animals & people -

audience seen as ~~critics~~ ~~critics~~ &
change - critics -

Motion Pictures didn't become successful
over night - 5 phases (= la mupipera)

A. 3 Phases of Film Development

1. Early Experiments

projection
animation
photography
motion picture

2. Story telling medium

3. Consolidation: production, distribution, exhibition

4. Sound movies

5. Upheaval & Radical Change

B. Coping in the 60s, 70s, & 80s

LFB magazine as bridge between printed
media w/ motion picture

Bork White

early Greeks - Aristotle right about
looking

add in the Real

Check Odscore

magic lantern 17th century

→ Theatre troupe - dis

work w/ moving

Will to stop within
Helium inverted film. → silver nitrate
acid - 1800

Still of story

EV ~~story~~ multiple bridge

Subj. as animals

T. Oskar : (Lumiere)

- developed kinetoscope
- remains ~~resolving~~ fix to the
- coin - with - slot peep show
- silent

A ~~the~~ interest was selling ~~machines~~
machines.

— Oskar Parry - bridge to D.W. Greer,
he developed the special visual of film
(E. train oblong)

— He made it affordable
— film's potential for editing, use of
invention didn't become general
→ early ~~the~~ movies.

D.W. Griffith - most important
film maker in early film
Biograph -

- emerged as a master of film technique
- greatest Amer. ~~film~~ storyteller
- raised movie to the level of art
- made film a powerful, popular
entertainment
- estab. a feature-length motion picture
as respectable, popular art form.

1915 - Amer. Epic → "Birth of a Nation"

Film makers of NY → look west young
man

Hollywood → made by movie -
before 1910 - no stars

Carl Linder → independent

→ ~~13th Street~~ ^{way} ~~Richard~~ - United Artist.

"Sound Vehicle" - Sound system

made, filmed & shared films
Drew use of comedy, → complicated
underlife.

Sound Motion pictures - 1920's -

1888 - sync sound & motion pictures.

1923 - Audion tube - DeForest -

Bill Lubet - Videophone

Industry slow to accept - too much money
w/ silent films - Warner Bros makes

the break - 1925 - Jazz Singer w/

Al Johnson - 1930 sound motion
pictures.

Disadv of sound

- 1) early mic picked up sounds indiscriminately
- 2) early talkies reverted to days of filmed stage plays
- 3) film editing was limited
- 4) Some silent stars could not make the
transition to sound

Advantages of Sound

- 1) dialogue, musical & verbal humor possible
- 2) characters to verbalized inner thoughts
- 3) clat to action (gunshot)
- 4) off screen narration

DeFields - Humor ~~Adapt~~
Depression -

- Spread movie attendance
1. dropped ticket prices
 2. gave away door prizes
 3. staged games & litter
 4. started on double bills (A & B movies)

1940s - present -
upheaval & radical change -
1940s Justice dept concerned about
monopolies - end of block bookings &
divert theater - holding by movie
companies
→ end of low budget films & double
bills. The Advent of TV - 1951
fell 20-40% where TV available.

Theaters must respond -

- 1) Themes & movies change - more
radical
- 2) lavish, big-budget films were feature
- 3) studios become subsidiaries of large
conglomerates

1970 → only studio =
distribution - independent producers arrange

1970s

- (finally = TV entertainment
films = youth market
1) new clientele - youth market -
2) production, dist exhibition were separated
3) studios were absorbed

Impact of Studios by conglomerates

1. ^{profits} profits from successful films went into general corp coffers
2. corp decision making place authority in the hands of people who know little about movies
3. Films creative processes was put in the hands of specialized technicians

Jennifer Andy 847-0754
↑
Coach (Bob Jones)
State (Oct 28th)
→ 10³⁰ PM
Nikki
(Nov 5th Georgia Stilites)
Oct 31st preview →

Expanded Entertainment, Los Angeles, calls it the 2nd International Turner of Animation.

9/12 Comm #25 -

John Milton

Freedom of Expression

→ are country influence English /

Engl. court system in U.S.
Jury determined libel not judge

A. Colonists in mass. ... experience

1. The Colonies

New Engl. colonies
Middle
Southern

2. Amer Colonies: Absence of Toleration

3. Benjamin Harris: exercise of Fidelity

4. From Compliance to Dissent

John Campbell: Compliance

James Franklin: Dissent

Bey " : Comp & Dissent

5. Freedom of Expression in Colonial Amer

3 Misconceptions

Enforcing Sedition Libel laws

trial of William Bradford

John Peter Zenger

Qualifications for Newspaper

Pub once a week
produced much news
main to engage
print ~~writing~~ & interest
appeal to ord. writing lit. skill
be timely
have stability

1620



84 years 'til
1st paper...

N.E.C.
W.C.
S.C.

separate island / very different.

interest in ed. → 9 yrs. Harvard → 12th printing press
1638 - Psalm book 1640 - high literacy
// interest in community matter
// culture

no newspaper until 4th generation. why?

1. wilderness absorbed energies
2. Eng. papers satisfied desire for news
3. Colonists had few ties w/ other communities
4. No support for a press (business)

mostly farmers → proud / displaced in Eng. ("stinking
slaves") → on land.

N.C. mixtures of colonies - Swedes, Dutch,
German, Lutheran, Catholic

S.C. - more laid back - looked for good life
large plantations

✓
All 3 colonies - very intolerant - more strict than
England.

1682 - stricter laws on printing "looked"

Benjamin Harris - 1690 attempt to print newspaper w/o
authority "Public Occurrences" - lasted
one day. Made colonists mad > small pox
epidemic, Indians - savages, prince of
France & mistress - sex scandals. Flees to
England - medicine business

1690 - 1704 - no publication except religious tracts
from Harvard

1st newspaper began to work.

1. pop increases
2. more wealth from farming
3. Soc Power's activities encourage advertising
4. Postal system
5. Self-governing concept increases
6. House of Commons resist Crown power to license
7. illiteracy at
8. commercial
9. shop thrives

1704 John Campbell - Print Master - Boston Newsletter
print by authority → success - followed rules -
read the mail. 14 yrs. - gets the shaft -
cont. → subsidized by govt & assembly - cost folded
Boston Gazette -

James Franklin - worked for Brooker
New Engl. Current vs Boston Gazette.
prints w/o authority, didn't think colonists getting
the news → unshackled the press from the licenser.
ended up in jail pissed off govins

first newspaper

Cotton Mather's and govt. controversy
increase " → goes to Philadelphia
says to Ben Franklin - editor → goes to Philadelphia
& publishes newspaper Pennsylvania Gazette.
1st Amer. Gazette - wanted to be considered as a printer.
→ freedom & expression - heliconian / not serious
Colonial Amer → very diverse - 13 separate islands.

Misconceptions re: Freedom of the Press

- ① Continuing struggle between royal judges & writers.
Not true → only approx. 6 trials
- ② Royal government threat to freedom
Not true → worst were colonists themselves
- ③ Popular Assemblies ~~were~~ were greatest champions of
freedom & expression.

- ① trial of William Bradford - printer (1692) - arrested
 ② " " John Peter Zenger by Quakers - seditious
 libel - supported separated

46 yrs later - NY printer
 used by Morris vs.
 Royal Governor Cosby →
 ends up in jail - German

Andrew Hamilton. So good
 lawyer → swifty & change
 not charge unfair →
 turns to anti-Cosby jury
 1897

Quaker faction to
 fight & persuaded
 Court determine the law
 of the fact

Truth should be a complete
 defence

evidence wrecked by
 juror

→ NY Gazette - prints
 "by authority" - becomes
 stable - William

Cosby new governor -

crook Chief Justice Morris
 replaces ~~assembly~~ ~~assembly~~

Seditious Enforcement

① Provincial Legislature

② Executive Officers - consent of upper house

③ Common Law Courts

(reserve #3)

① brought about revolution -
 mercantile sys (with trade agreement)
 demand raw materials from colonies
 Eng manufacture → colonist must buy from Eng.
 cloth

② Act 8 (1751) - restriction on printing of
 New money runs out

③ — 1763 New Laws - Currency restriction/
 New Taxes / Affirm Parliament

4 diff philosophy dev.

South Thomas
 printer - mass. Spg.
 witness of 1st battle of
 rev. - 400 bks.

They
 40%
 loyalists
 to Brit

Business
 Conservative/Separatists

Break from the crown

Samuel Adams radical propagandist.

James

Putnam (spg)
 bookseller in the

"Royal Gazette" (NY)
 everything he print
 building is burned down

James

Dickinson

"Pennant of
 the revolution"

"letters to a
 Pennsylvania Farmer"
 need for freedom of
 info/press

1st PR man "master of the puppets"
 (1) Committee of correspondents
 (2) Sons of Liberty

1st attempt @ forming news
 gathering org. (eg. AP.)
 report to S.A. - Boston Gazette
 Thomas Paine "Common Sense"

→ body
 Action Group - Boston Tea Party

was there -

8/29 - Fellow - 425

Intro - Hist & Phil of Amer Mass Media

AG Keller - "und. living hist. und.
where it came from"
press = living hist.

Trough hist → mix w/ current present e.g.
political scene

- ① How did pol. reporting evolve? current issue.
- ② " " pol/soc/econ and affected press?
- ③ Press effect " " " " ?
- ④ How has freedom of press dev. - been turned off? Why?
- ⑤ Who key players in Press Hist.? media people → FR - Hearst ...

→ why take this class? required.
→ gain km. of Hist. of media - country.

helps to be enthusiastic

W330 - office (10⁰⁰ - 11⁰⁰ / 1⁰⁰ - 2⁰⁰) MW

texts - power & the press - paperback

Discovering the News

Take & Plenty

→ Kinkos - used - packet req. reading
study guides.

look @ study guide - read material - no ques. w.
study guide -

practice quizzes.

2 ~~units~~ Exams 50 w/c +/f

1 Final 100 pt. → 140 pts. cumulative.

10 pt. expert of the week → pick ~~recommended~~ reading

Forerunner of Amer. mass media:

Rome/Bizh ~~legal~~
~~suit~~
~~press~~

misconception re: colonists coming to Amer.

predominant Hist. - curiosity about Pelham + avirulent
2 types News - important
interest

society shapes news

→ developed in authoritarian system
each society controls via legal/econ/soc/political
1st & 14th amendment
France's Spain/USSR
look deeper into
relationship between society
& press

↓
nature of state/truth/moral conduct
verbal news

barter/trade propel written communication

→ Shakespeare's couriers + delivering news
Pompey 1st providing slaves → Acta Diurna + wrote
down into slaves.

59^{BC} - 225

publish journal on the wall

(Rome perfected notation & correspondence)

1456. (15th century) Gutenberg / print Bible

1460 first

1476 - 1st print press imported to England by

1490s - ^{europ} major city in Europe William Caxton

verbal transmission still faster via wandering monks - 1st journalists - walking newspaper.

Who did pre-press serve? ~~control~~ ① Church leaders.

who controlled most intelligent/daily to read & write

by clergy

② Statesmen

some illiterate

③ merchants/Bankers

House of Burgundy

authoritarian society → most common dev. in authoritarian society.

The Authoritarian Theory of the Press (get over it)

① state ranked higher than individual in the scale of social value

②



200 yrs. printing used as tool of the state - restricted

people responsible & self-rule par. ruling.
this type of society - characters of England
- 1400's - appropriate conditions -
period of persecution - Spanish inquisition

1485 - Battle of Bosworth Field - Henry of Tudor

Golden Age - but not back

concept of prior restraint - licensing
system to own } presses
 } control

Star Chamber -

The Libertarian theory of the press

but brought about this change?

1. Power of human reason vs. inherited kw.
2. Reformers challenged authority of Church of Rome

30/12/14



3. New middle class

1. Challenged idea of fixed status
2. Ushered in world of social mobility
4. Political revolution - challenged right to arbitrary rule
5. Enlightenment

John Milton
P.A. Page

1. Reliance on reason to discriminate between truth & error
2. Need of a free marketplace of ideas so order & reason may work
3. Functions of the press

criminal libel - concern of the Star Chamber

A. New had early interest in News

how came didn't develop - says take over

theory =

- Arthur Hailey
- ~~the~~ Cibaletovic
- John Milton

power of press - 7-9

intro 3-9

chap 1 13-22

2 32-53

10/5

AUGUSTO -

I COULDN'T LOCATE YOUR TRANSLATION OF THE VASQUEZ
ARTICLE. WHICH BIN DID YOU LEAVE IT IN?
PLEASE DROP ME A NOTE. ---

JOE BUSTINOS

I left it in the box with my name on it.
Why did you wait so long to let me know when
I even gave you my home phone number?